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GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT

AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENTS IN MINORITY-INHABITED AREAS OF COMMUNIST CHINA

CIA/RR-G-7

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS

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FOREWORD

The purpose of this report is to present information available concerning the policies of the Chinese Communists towards the numerous ethnic and religious minority groups in China, particularly as these policies are reflected in the establishment of so-called autonomous administrative units. The scope of this report includes brief descriptions of the minority groups, discussions of minority programs and their effectuation, and summaries of the autonomous administrative units in textual, tabular, and map form. Although brief summaries of the number, distribution, history, and economies of the more important minority groups are included, no attempt has been made to provide comprehensive ethnic studies. This report does not purport to present a detailed analysis of all the political ramifications of Chinese Communist policy towards minorities, nor does the study evaluate or compare Chinese Communist versus Soviet policies and interests in minority groups along the Sino-Soviet borderland.

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CIA 11519	Ethno-Linguistic Groups in Sinkiang
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CIA 12667	Communist Autonomous Administrative Units - 1953

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AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENTS IN MINORITY-INHABITED AREAS OF COMMUNIST CHINA

Summary

An estimated 40,000,000 persons of China possess characteristics sufficiently different from the Han Chinese* to be classified as minorities. The largest concentrations of minority peoples occur in the frontier areas of northwestern and southwestern China. Politically, the three most important groups are the Mongols, Tibetans, and Muslims, of which some have long maintained varying degrees of independence from the Central Government. Numerous aboriginal groups also inhabit southwestern China, where many of them live in isolation and seclusion from the Chinese. Major conflicts between minority groups and the Chinese have been caused by the encroachment of Chinese agriculturists on areas traditionally inhabited by minorities, and by Chinese attempts to secure political control over these areas. The unstable political conditions in recent decades also have contributed to tension between Chinese and minority groups. Every Chinese government, including the Communist, has attempted to secure control of its minority-inhabited frontier areas. The most striking feature of the Communist efforts is the unprecedented speed and apparent effectiveness with which these areas have been brought under the domination of the Central Government.

* "Han" means Chinese by culture and language.

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The Chinese Communists have adopted a program for minority peoples calling for sweeping political, economic, and social changes. The major point of this program is the establishing of autonomous governments in minority-inhabited areas. Each autonomous unit is fitted closely within and subordinated to the Chinese administrative system, and the "autonomy" of an autonomous government is slight. An autonomous government is under the jurisdiction of an ordinary people's government (by definition a Chinese body), from which it receives "leadership" and "guidance." Autonomy is not granted spontaneously merely on the wishes of the local inhabitants; rather, a preparatory period of intense political indoctrination by specially trained cadres precedes the implementation of autonomy. Although most members of the governing organs of an autonomous government are of the particular minority, they have undoubtedly been indoctrinated with Communist gospel. Communist control of an autonomous government is further cemented by having a small number of Chinese on the staff and through the common practice of having the chairman of the autonomous government a party member, holding key positions in provincial and regional administrations. Further control of minority areas has been gained through the familiar Chinese practice of splitting minority groups into small, easily manipulated administrative units.

The Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region is one of the oldest of the autonomous units, administratively at a level comparable to the six

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major administrative areas. Tibet and Sinkiang are expected to be granted regional autonomy at a comparable level. There are 13 autonomous units at the special-district level, perhaps 40 at the hsien (county) level, and several hundred at sub-hsien levels.

Attitudes and reactions of the minority people toward the Chinese Communist program are extremely difficult to assess. Some minority people, however, seem to have been won over, perhaps temporarily, to the Communist fold. The minority program of the Communists, with its stress upon educating and civilizing the minority groups, may well result in the gradual disintegration of the resistant minority core areas.

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I. Minority Groups of China

The population of China, according to a recent Chinese Communist source, totals 483,687,862. 1/ * Of this total an estimated 30,000,000 to 50,000,000 persons possess cultural characteristics that distinguish them in some way from the dominant Han Chinese. The Chinese Communists list over 60 national minority groups throughout China, with an aggregate population of about 40,000,000. 2/ Estimates of the minority population vary widely not only because adequate census data are lacking, but also because definitions vary as to the term "minority." The Communists, for example, include all Muslims, as a national minority. The Muslims, however, include both Chinese who have embraced Islam but in other ways are identical with ethnic Chinese, and non-Chinese groups who are differentiated from the Chinese by physical and linguistic characteristics.

Although minority groups are found throughout all China, the major concentrations are in the frontier regions of northwestern and southwestern China, as shown on accompanying map, CIA 12666. Many of the minority people such as the Thai, Mongols, and others are linked ethnically with peoples in neighboring countries. Minorities in the five provinces of Northwest China (Kansu, Ningsia, Shensi, Tsinghai, and Sinkiang) reportedly number about 6,300,000 out of a total of more

*Footnote references in Arabic numerals refer to sources listed in Appendix D.

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than 23,000,000 people. In Southwest China (Kweichow, Sikang, Szechwan, and Yunnan Provinces), there are some 20,000,000 members of minority groups out of a total of over 70,000,000 people. In densely populated Central-South China, with a population of 137,000,000, there are about 8,000,000 additional minority peoples, largely concentrated in western Kwangsi with smaller numbers in Hunan and Kwangtung. In Northeast China (Manchuria) an estimated 1,200,000 Koreans are concentrated in the North Korea-Manchuria border area.* Some Mongol banners are located in Jehol Province, and a few scattered Tungusic communities are found in northern Manchuria. The minority population of North China consists of comparatively small numbers of Muslims and Mongols. Additional minority peoples include an estimated 800,000 Mongols of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and the 1,000,000 Tibetans of Tibet. These Communist estimates are somewhat lower than most available statistics.

Economy of the minority peoples varies with group and area. A few groups have an intensive agrarian economy not unlike the Chinese. Most groups, however, are either primitive agriculturists of the hillsides, animal herders of the steppe lands, or sedentary agriculturists of the oases. In the fluid transitional zones separating

*The Communist figures cited above for minority groups are in general larger than most western estimates.

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Chinese from minority groups, there is persistent conflict between the intensive Chinese economy and the various economies of minority groups.

The degree of cultural assimilation of minority groups by the Chinese varies with the groups. At one extreme are minority groups who have resisted all Chinese attempts at control and have retreated to inaccessible areas to maintain independence from the Chinese. At the opposite extreme are tribespeople, usually few in number, who live in Chinese-dominated villages in the valleys and have largely adopted Chinese culture. Between the two extremes are groups who maintain some contact with the Chinese but retain most of their native customs and habits.

A. Major Minority Groups

1. Mongols

The Mongol population of China is dispersed over a vast, crescent-shaped arc extending from northern Manchuria to northwestern Sinkiang. According to George B. Cressey, this region has an area of 2,545,000 square kilometers. 3/

Mongol population statistics vary greatly, but a total of about 2,000,000 is often given. The largest Mongol concentrations are in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR), an administrative unit created from western Manchuria and parts of the former provinces of Jehol and Chahar. Considering the area covered by the IMAR, the

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number of Mongols given in Communist statistics, 800,000, seems too low by several hundred thousand. Another 400,000 Mongols live in Suiyüan, Ningsia, northern Tsinghai, and parts of Kansu. An additional 60,000 Mongols are distributed in several areas of northern Sinkiang, as shown on accompanying map CIA 11519. 5/ A few Mongols reside in the portion of Jehel not incorporated in the IMAR and in other peripheral areas. The Mongol population is believed to be static or even declining, largely due to a high incidence of venereal disease and general lack of medical facilities.

The Mongols are customarily divided into four main groups: northern, eastern, southern, and western. The northern and eastern Mongols are found in the northern part of the IMAR. The southern Mongols include the Ordos Mongols inhabiting southern Suiyüan, other Mongol groups in northern Suiyüan, and the Chahar Mongols who inhabit a major part of the IMAR. The western Mongols inhabit northern Sinkiang, northern Tsinghai, Ningsia, and parts of Kansu. These groups are further subdivided into leagues and banners, which are essentially tribal administrative units. Each league is customarily composed of several banners.

The traditional Mongols are pastoral nomads entirely dependent for their existence upon the short steppe grasses. Mongol economy is based on mobility, since the scanty rainfall of the steppe area produces pastures that can support herds for only short periods.

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The felt-covered tents or yurts of the Mongols are of simple construction and can be transported easily. The diet has little variety and is derived chiefly from animals.

The ancient pattern of Mongol life has altered slowly owing to the gradual encroachment of Chinese colonists on their pasture lands during the past 50 years. The use of grazing lands for the immobile, intensive type of Chinese agriculture has forced the Mongols to search for new grazing lands, generally more restricted in area than the old, or to modify their traditional economy. Chinese traders operating in Mongol lands have also contributed to the disintegration of Mongol culture and political instability.

2. Tibetans

The political boundaries of Tibet include only a part of the area that is ethnically and linguistically Tibetan (see accompanying map CIA 12666). Tibet, as the term is commonly used today, is often called Outer Tibet or sometimes Farther Tibet; the former Inner Tibet or Nearer Tibet was nominally incorporated into the Chinese administrative pattern with the creation of Sikang and Tsinghai provinces in 1928. Tibetan peoples occupy an area approximately 2,350,000 square kilometers in extent in northwestern Szechwan, and along the Kansu-Tsinghai border, as well as in Sikang, Tsinghai, and Tibet. Despite this vast territory and the widely scattered nodes of population, Tibetans are unified by language, the many dialects

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generally being mutually understandable, and by the powerful dominance of Tibetan Buddhism.

Population statistics for Tibetans, as for other minority peoples, are inadequate and unreliable. The population of Tibet is estimated at from 1,000,000 (the latest Chinese Communist figure) to 3,000,000 with 1,500,000 most commonly quoted. Total Tibetan population of all China is generally estimated at between 2,500,000 and 3,000,000, which agrees with statistics recently published in a Communist newspaper. 6/ The Tibetan population of Sikang probably exceeds 600,000; Communist reports give a figure of 500,000 Tibetans inhabiting the Tibetan Autonomous District of Sikang, which comprises only a portion of the province. 7/ Another 600,000 to 700,000 Tibetans live in Tsinghai Province.

Tibetans are divided on the basis of two distinct economies into (1) the nomadic tribes inhabiting the steppe and high plateau grasslands, and (2) the sedentary agriculturists cultivating the isolated valley bottoms. The pastoral nomad tribesmen of the "black tents" are culturally quite different from the sedentary cultivators of the earthen houses. High-altitude farming is carried on in some areas, particularly the valleys and depressions near Lhasa. This consists of raising a few hardy cereal crops, often combined with the grazing of yaks, sheep, and goats.

In the borderlands separating ethnic Tibetans from ethnic Chinese, Chinese agriculturists have recently been penetrating traditional

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Tibetan lands. The penetration is not on so large a scale nor so successful as the Chinese encroachment on grazing lands of the Mongol steppes. The borderland between Tibetans and the Chinese is predominantly an area of high mountains, great river gorges, and isolated and almost inaccessible fertile valley bottoms. In much of this area live semi-independent tribal groups, apparently of Tibetan mixture, who long have functioned as buffer groups between the Chinese and the Tibetans. 8/9/

3. Muslims

The Muslims of China are divided into two groups: (1) Chinese Muslims, a people of mixed racial characteristics who speak Chinese and are followers of Islam, and (2) non-Chinese Islamic people chiefly of Turkic descent. The Chinese Communists regard both the Chinese and non-Chinese Muslims as one minority nationality. Although the Muslims are scattered throughout all of China, the main concentrations are in the Northwest, particularly Sinkiang Province where most of the non-Chinese Muslims reside. Outside of the Northwest, the largest concentrations are in Yünnan and Hopeh.

Estimates of the total Muslim population vary tremendously, from 8,000,000 to 48,000,000. The latter figure is often cited by Muslim leaders. The official Jen Min Jih Pao, Chinese Communist news organ, gives a figure of about 10,000,000 for the nine "Islamic nationalities" in China, including (1) 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 hui-tsu, or Chinese

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Muslims; (2) about 4,000,000 non-Chinese Muslims in Sinkiang; and (3) about 200,000 non-Chinese Muslims in other parts of China. 10/
A recent non-Chinese source gives a total of 8,300,000 Muslims, including 4,700,000 Chinese Muslims and 3,600,000 non-Chinese Muslims. 11/

Approximately 5,000,000 Chinese Muslims are scattered throughout China; somewhat over 2,000,000 inhabit Kansu, Ningsia, and Tsinghai. The latter are the most important and cohesive of the Chinese Muslim groups in China. These people are descendants of Arab merchants who entered western China in the seventh and eighth centuries. Although much of their material culture has been derived from the Han Chinese, they have retained, in addition to their religion, certain customs and traits definitely setting them apart from the Chinese. The Muslims usually live in communities apart from the Chinese, but differ little from them economically. A few occupations, however, such as innkeeper, trader, and soldier, attract a much larger proportion of Muslims than Chinese.

Two small but important non-Chinese Muslim groups are located in the Kansu-Tsinghai border area -- the Salars and the Tung-hsiang. The Salars are a group of Turki-speaking peoples who came from Samarkand during the 12th century and live southeast of Hsi-ning (Sining), the capital of Tsinghai. Their numbers are variously estimated at from 100,000 to 300,000. As a group they have resisted Chinese acculturation and have figured prominently in Muslim revolts against Chinese

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authority. The Tung-hsiang or "East Country," Muslims inhabit a triangular area formed by the juncture of the Yellow and Tao rivers in Kansu Province, near the Tsinghai border and south and east of Lan-chou (Lanchow), the capital of Kansu. The number of Tung-hsiang Muslims is thought to be about 200,000. They speak a Mongolian language and are probably of Mongolian racial stock. ^{12/} Like the Salars, the Tung-hsiang Muslims have remained a militantly resistant and homogeneous community and have played important roles in recent Muslim uprisings. In the Tung-hsiang area is the city of Lin-hsia, important to the Muslims as the religious and cultural center of Islam in Northwest China.

By far the majority of non-Chinese Muslims are the Turkic peoples of Sinkiang Province. They will be discussed in greater detail in section I-C of this report.

B. Southwestern China Minority Groups

An estimated 16,000,000 to 20,000,000 aboriginal people dwell in large sections of Yunnan, Kweichow, and Kwangsi Provinces and in smaller sections of Sikang, Hunan, Szechwan, and Kwangtung Provinces. The largest of these minority groups are the Thai, the Yi-chia, and the Miao. Most of the minority groups of Southwest and Central-South China originally inhabited all of southern China. Under the pressure of an advancing Chinese frontier, these groups have migrated into the wilder and more remote areas, consisting principally of dissected

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tableland, characterized by steep slopes, deep valleys, and relatively little level land. While most of the tribesmen are primitive farmers and hunters of the hills, some who live in the valleys have an economy similar to the Chinese.

1. Thai (Tai)

The Thai, or Tai, people and related groups are located in southern China, primarily in the provinces of Yünnan, Kwangsi, and Kweichow and on Hainan Island. Approximately 2,000,000 each are found in Kweichow and Kwangsi, and from 2,000,000, to 5,250,000 in Yünnan. 14/ Approximately 250,000 Li people, thought to be related to the Thai, inhabit Hainan Island. The Thai do not form a single homogeneous group, but are scattered in several areas, as shown on accompanying map CIA 12666. They are known by various names such as the Chung-chia (in Kweichow), and the Shui (in Yünnan).

Although Thai groups speak various dialects, they are mutually intelligible, as well as intelligible to Thai-speaking people of Indochina, Thailand, and Burma. 15/ Unlike most other southwestern minorities the majority of Thai live in the valleys. In southern Yünnan, where important groups live, the Chinese fear the malaria-ridden valleys and thus remain in the more healthy uplands. 16/ Most of the Thai are sedentary agriculturists, growing irrigated rice in much the same manner as the Chinese. Because of the cultural similarities between the Thai and Chinese and the general tractability of the Thai, assimilation by the Chinese is taking place with greater ease than in the case of most other minority groups. 17/

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2. Yi-chia (Lolo or Nosu)

The Yi-chia, more commonly known as Lolo or Nosu, are found in greatest numbers in the border area between southeastern Sikang and southwestern Szechwan. They are also scattered throughout much of Yünnan and in western Kweichow. Yi-chia population statistics range from slightly more than 1,000,000 to a recent Chinese Communist estimate of 3,400,000. 18/ The most cohesive Yi-chia groups inhabit the Ta-liang Shan area, which includes part of southeastern Sikang and small adjacent areas of Szechwan and Yünnan and is known as "Independent Lolo Land." In this remote area of high, rugged mountains cut by steep gorges, the Yi-chia have remained isolated and virtually independent of Chinese rule. The population of so-called Independent Lolo Land is estimated to be from 250,000 to well over 1,000,000. 19/20/

The Yi-chia are primarily upland dwellers, settling above 6,000 feet. The type of farming they practice is intermediate between the shifting "slash and burn" system of most Miao groups and the plow system of the Thai. 21/ Yi-chia areas of Yünnan, which have more contact with the Chinese, are gradually adopting Chinese culture.

3. Miao

Recent estimates of the Miao population in China give a total of 3,500,000. 22/23/ Approximately two-thirds of the Miao are concentrated in the mountainous areas of Kweichow Province, chiefly in the east. Another Miao concentration is in western Hunan Province

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where approximately 300,000 live. 24/ Miao groups also occur in southern and eastern Yunnan Province and scattered small groups inhabit adjacent provinces. The original home of the Miao is thought to have been in the central coastal areas of China. Expansion by the Chinese south and west has forced them to their present mountainous retreats. They have been present in Yunnan supposedly only within the past 100 years, perhaps indicating a continuing movement to the south. 25/ Relations with the Chinese have been unsettled, as evidenced by Miao uprisings during the 18th and 19th centuries. The last Miao rebellion was quelled in 1871. In Chinese society the Miao occupy a low status, lower than most other minority groups. 26/

The Miao are characteristically primitive shifting hillside agriculturists who follow a "slash and burn" system of farming. The few Miao living on the lower slopes are plow farmers cultivating rice. Miao groups are usually differentiated on the basis of dress, such as the Black Miao, White Miao, and Flowery Miao.

4. Other Southwestern Minority Groups

In addition to the three large minority groups, several lesser groups have been identified in southwestern China. Widely scattered throughout the provinces of Hunan, Kwangsi, Kweichow, Yunnan, and Kwangtung are some 500,000 to 600,000 Yao. 27/ The Yao language is closely related to the Miao. Dwelling chiefly in the mountains, the Yao have a subsistence type of agricultural economy similar to that of other minority groups of the southwest.

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The Mo-so, or Na-khi, with a population estimated at 300,000, are concentrated in the mountainous country of northwestern Yünnan and also occupy southern Sikang and Szechwan. 28/ Mo-so settlements consist of terraced fields with rock walls, at elevations ranging from 6,000 to 10,000 feet. Subsistence agriculture, herding, and a little mining are the main economic activities. The Mo-so have in the past been victimized by the Tibetans, Chinese, and Yi-chia alike.

The Min-chia are concentrated in the plains of Ta-li in western Yünnan. Although Chinese Communists recognize them as a minority group, culturally they differ little from the Chinese. They do have a distinctive language, but most of them also speak Chinese. Unlike most minority groups of the southwest, the Min-chia are primarily rice farmers.

Other minor groups include a few thousand Li-su and Lu-tzu, shifting agriculturists of the Salween River Valley near the northern Burma border, and the La-hu of southwestern Yünnan. A number of tribes of Tibetan descent live in northwestern Yünnan, eastern Sikang, and northwestern Szechwan. They have a combined or fused Tibetan-Chinese culture and act as buffer tribes between Chinese and Tibetans. There are also an indeterminate number of Chinese Muslims in southwestern China particularly in Yünnan, who are descendents of Arab sea traders. Except for the traditions of Islam, which are somewhat indifferently observed, these southwestern Chinese Muslims are culturally identical to the Chinese.

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C. Minorities of Sinkiang

Sinkiang, the most ethnically diverse and complex of all the provinces of China (see accompanying map CIA 11519), is also the largest, being comparable to Texas in extent. Its population of about 4,000,000, however, is relatively small. The proportion of ethnic Chinese is likewise small, approximately 6 percent of the total. 29/ Sinkiang is a land of high mountain ranges and vast semiarid or arid depressions. Outside of a few merchants, officials, traders, and soldiers, most of the inhabitants are either sedentary agriculturists growing a fairly wide variety of crops in the irrigated oases, or nomadic herders of the grassy steppes and mountain valleys.

The largest of eight ethnic groups in Sinkiang is the Turki, or Uighurs, who number more than 3,000,000. 30/ The Turki live chiefly in oasis cities rimming the Tarim basin, principally the larger towns of the southwest. They comprise the largest non-Chinese Muslim group within China. The second largest ethnic group is the Kazaks, also Muslims, numbering approximately 425,000 and concentrated in northwestern Sinkiang. 31/ They are primarily a nomadic people, although farming is often combined with herding. Closely related to the Kazaks are the Kirghiz, also a nomadic people, who likewise are followers of Islam. They number only about 60,000 and are concentrated in the mountain valleys of southwestern Sinkiang. 32/ The remaining minority groups, comprising about 5 percent of the population of Sinkiang, or

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200,000 people, include the Tungkans (Chinese Muslims) estimated at 100,000, the so-called White Russians, Mongols, Tadjiks, and Manchus. Rebellions against Chinese authority have occurred, and general relationships of the various nationalities with the Chinese have been turbulent and complex. The close linguistic, religious, and other cultural ties of the people of Sinkiang with people across the border in the Soviet Union has contributed to the complex political situation of this area.

D. Lesser Minority Groups

In Northeast China (Manchuria) there are about 1,200,000 Koreans, the majority inhabiting southeastern Kirin Province near the North Korean boundary. Many of these Koreans entered Manchuria during the Japanese occupation as a part of a Japanese-sponsored immigration program, and the majority make their living as rice farmers.

In the northern forested areas of Manchuria live the Tungusic tribes, such as the Manchus, Oronchons, Goldi, Solons, and Daghors. The great majority are nomadic hunters of fur-bearing animals. The Manchus, once the rulers of all China, have nearly all been assimilated into Chinese culture, and only a few small groups retain a separate ethnic identity.

In Kwangtung and Kiangsi are an estimated 12,000,000 Hakkas, or "guest families." 33/ Hakka origins are obscure; apparently North China was their original home. Although the Hakkas speak a peculiar

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dialect and do not marry Cantonese, they are in other respects similar to Chinese groups. Apparently the Chinese Communists do not consider the Hakkas a minority nationality.

E. Relationships Between the Chinese and Minority Groups

Relations between the Chinese and the non-Chinese minority groups have been conditioned by the inherent Chinese belief in the superiority of Chinese civilization and culture. Chinese annals give little definitive information on the diverse minorities of southwestern China but group all, without distinction, under the rubric Man, "barbarian." 34/ The struggle between Chinese and non-Chinese groups has continued throughout much of Chinese history. Expanding from their cultural core in North China, the Chinese have come in conflict with different racial and cultural groups. Despite the long periods of conflict between Chinese and non-Chinese peoples, the Chinese have been able to absorb many of the non-Chinese peoples with varying degrees of difficulty. Political and cultural conflicts also occur between individual minority groups -- Tibetan versus Muslim for example -- and feuds between tribes of the same minority group are common. This hostility within a minority group has often been exploited by the Chinese to control minority-inhabited areas.

In general, non-Chinese who are in a distinct minority are regarded by the Chinese with curiosity and tolerance. Chinese

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attitudes toward non-Chinese are likely to be more antagonistic, however, where non-Chinese are in the majority, especially if they compete economically.

The history of Chinese-minority group relations in recent times has pivoted about the particular political situation of the moment and economic expansionism. Control by the Central Government in the minority-inhabited frontier provinces has often been weak and ineffective. In the border provinces local war lords, whose only motive was exploitation of the area they controlled, have held sway for long periods of time and have often treated minority groups oppressively. Even when the Central Government was able to administer minority-inhabited border areas effectively, the treatment of minority peoples by Chinese officials has not been good. Particularly turbulent relations have existed between Muslims and Han Chinese. During the 19th century and continuing into the present century a series of prolonged and bloody Muslim revolts took place, chiefly in the northwest but to a lesser extent in other parts of China as well. The history of Tibetan-Chinese relations in the present century has likewise been punctuated by sporadic warfare as the Chinese attempted to extend their control into areas traditionally under Tibetan rule.

A factor often contributing to the political instability of a region has been the expansion, particularly in the past 50 years, of an intensive Chinese agrarian economy into bordering steppe lands

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most suitable for extensive nomadic herding. The results of this program of economic expansionism have been increased tension between Chinese and minority groups and alterations in the economic and social life of both Chinese and minority groups. The removal of the protective cover of grass has converted some of the semiarid steppe lands into barren wasteland.

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II. Evolution of Autonomous Units

A. Minority Programs

After the overthrow of the Manchus in 1911, the first pronouncement regarding the status of minority groups within China was voiced by Sun Yat-sen. His views later were embodied in Article 5 of the provisional constitution of 1912, which stated that "citizens of the Chinese Republic are all equal, and there shall be no racial, class, or religious distinctions." According to Sun Yat-sen, there were five major racial stocks -- Han Chinese, Manchus, Muslims, Mongols, and Tibetans -- and each race was to be permitted to retain and develop its culture. Although the Nationalist Government espoused this principle, the inherent belief in the superiority of the Han Chinese was so deep-seated that equality was never accorded to minority groups. In 1928 a Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs was created with ministerial status directly under the Executive Yuan; but the chaotic political and military conditions in the following years negated any comprehensive program for these areas.

A general statement of Chinese Communist policy toward minorities is contained in the Common Program of the Communist Central People's Political Consultative Council (CPPCC), adopted 3 October 1949. The Common Program is one of the three documents that collectively comprise the constitutional basis of the Chinese Communist Government. Article 9 of the Common Program consists of the simple statement that "all nationalities of the People's Republic of China

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have equal rights and duties." Article 9 is thus similar to Article 5 of the provisional constitution of 1912. The blueprint of Communist policy toward minority groups, however, is contained in a separate chapter of the Common Program consisting of Articles 50 through 53. Article 50 is the most important and contains the following statements:

All nationalities within the boundary of the People's Republic of China are equal. Unity and mutual help shall be effected among them to oppose imperialism and the public enemies within these nationalities so that the People's Republic of China will become a big family of fraternity and cooperation of all nationalities. Greater nationalism and chauvinism shall be opposed and acts of discrimination, oppression and splitting the unity of the various nationalities shall be prohibited.

Article 51 concerns the establishment of regional autonomy by which "nationalities" shall have "appropriate" representation in the "local organs of state power." Article 52 states that "nationalities" have the right to join the People's Liberation Army and organize local people's public security forces. Article 53 states that national minorities have the freedom of developing their languages and preserving or "reforming" their customs, habits, and religious beliefs. This Article also states that the People's Government shall help the nationalities develop their political, economic, cultural, and educational systems.

The General Minority Program of 8 August 1952, which is reproduced in full as Appendix A, is the basic document followed by the

Communists in implementing their minority policies.* In Article 2 statements that "autonomous regions of the various nationalities are an integral part of the People's Republic of China" and that "the self-governing organs of the autonomous regions" are under "the leadership of the People's Governments of a higher level" reveal that no real autonomy is vested in an "autonomous" government. Article 7 states that the administrative status of an autonomous area will be equivalent to that of present units of the Chinese administrative system according to the size and population of the minority-inhabited area. Thus, the autonomous areas function as part of and within the highly centralized framework of the Chinese Communist administrative system. In the Communist administrative pattern, each level of government is responsible to and must obey each higher level, and all levels are under the jurisdiction of the Central People's Government. Article 12 provides for the inclusion of a Han Chinese on the staff of the autonomous governing organ. In practice, a Han Chinese usually acts as a vice chairman. Undoubtedly, the Chinese members of the autonomous government are trusted Party members who can be relied upon to "direct" the government along proper channels. Chapter 4 has several articles concerning autonomous rights, such as use of the particular minority

*Two important reports touching upon most aspects of the minority program were released in August 1952, one by Li Wei-han, Chairman of the Commission of the Affairs of Nationalities, and the second by Ulanfu, Chairman of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. 35/ 36/

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language or dialect by the autonomous organ of government in discharging its duties. Chapter 6 is significant for the statement that the "People's Government of a higher level" is directed to assist the self-governing organ of an autonomous area in carrying out its various duties. In Article 35 of Chapter 6 the people's government of a higher level is instructed "to assist the various nationalities to establish the concepts of equality, friendliness, unity, and mutual aid among one another, and to rectify the various 'isms' which favor dominating nationalities and narrow nationalism." A list of rights for "scattered" minority groups was issued concurrently with the General Minority Program.

Analysis of the General Minority Program reveals that each autonomous government is a component of the closely knit administrative system, supervised and "assisted" by the next higher administrative organ. Ultimate authority and direction rests with the Central People's Government. The government of an autonomous area has no more autonomy than that of the standard administrative unit.

At the August 1952 meeting of the Central Government Council, provisional general rules were approved regarding organization of committees of minority affairs. 37/ These committees have the duty of directing and supervising work in minority-inhabited areas. They are to be established, based on the need of minority work, at all

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levels of administration from the administrative-area level through to the hsien. Minority affairs of administrative units with only a small number of minority people are administered by special offices or persons, rather than committees. Each of the committees of minority affairs is subordinate to and under the jurisdiction of the committee at the next highest administrative level. All committees are under the direction of the Commission on the Affairs of National Minorities, which is subordinate to the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the State Administrative Council.* In principle, each of the national minorities is represented on the Commission according to population. The Commission is organized into four regional divisions plus a division to administer Tibetan affairs.

B. Methods Employed in Implementing Autonomy

1. Political Indoctrination

Although Chinese Communist policy varies with area, situation, and the minority group, generalizations can be made regarding the methods employed in implementing regional autonomy. In all areas of China firm military control has preceded political programs.

*The State Administrative Council, analagous to the Soviet Council of Ministers, is one of the four subsidiary organs of the Central Government Council. The Central Government Council is a top-level policy-making and administrative organ with broad legislative, executive, and appointive powers.

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In 1950 several teams were dispatched from Peking to classify minority groups, estimate their population, and gather pertinent information relative to conditions in the area. 38/ Undoubtedly these teams initiated indoctrination of the tribespeople on the beneficent policies of their "big brothers." One report states that the teams met with considerable success in explaining Communist aims. 39/

The initial surveys have been followed by more intensive indoctrination, such as sending native leaders to schools for brief political training. Reports also state that local minority leaders were given "grand tours" of large cities to impress them with the achievements of Communism. 40/ Theoretically, tribal leaders return to their people enthusiastically spreading the Communist gospel.

To prepare minority areas for autonomy, intensive political indoctrination is carried out by specially trained cadres. To train these cadres, a Central Institute of Nationalities was established in June 1951 at Peking. Subsequently eight branches have been opened in Canton, Ch'eng-tu, K'un-ming, Kuei-yang, Lan-chou, Nan-ning, Ti-hua, and Wu-ch'ang. 41/ 42/ Selected students take required courses, such as "the Chinese Communist Party" and "Nationalities Policy and Problems," for a period of about 10 months. 43/ 44/ After completion of their training, cadres are organized and sent out to instruct, indoctrinate, and prepare the area for eventual autonomy.

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Apparently these Communist-trained natives will gradually replace traditional tribal leaders. As a rule, cadres do not return to their native villages. A reported 70,000 minority-nationality personnel have been trained by the Institute. 45/ In addition to training cadres, the Institute and its branches do research in the various minority languages, so that magazines and books may be disseminated in these languages.

After indoctrination and training has progressed in the minority area, preparatory committees for the implementation of autonomy are organized. At a conference held prior to the establishment of one autonomous area, the requirements for a "qualified" delegate to the autonomous government were described as follows:

A delegate must be a supporter of the Common Program, the policy on nationalities, Chairman Mao, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Central People's Government. He should be a patriot, an ardent fighter against imperialism -- the enemy of the people -- and a man who will maintain close contact with the people and render them his best service. . . . 46/

With such a slate of delegates, speedy legislative action would seem to be foreordained.

In some areas, small administrative units at the hsien level or below are organized into model autonomous units. In the words of a Communist news report, these units are designed "to afford examples of nationalities democratic political construction for the people of various nationalities and to penetratingly carry out propaganda work

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on the nationalities policy." 47/ The model autonomous units are later incorporated into larger autonomous areas.

The day when an autonomous area is officially proclaimed is one of celebration. When the Thai Autonomous District in southern Yunnan was established, "over 10,000 persons . . . from a distance as far as 200 li . . . [carried] out recreational activities, such as boating, elephant play, dancing and film shows." 48/

2. Economic and Cultural Measures

The Communists have employed various economic and cultural measures to gain the support of minority groups and to further basic Communist policies.

Economically, Communist policy is one of favoritism toward minorities. Prices received by minorities for their goods have been raised; and conversely, prices paid by minority people for cloth, salt, tea, and other essential goods have been lowered. To implement this policy, mobile trading teams have been dispatched to the more remote areas, and government-operated trading companies have been established in traditional market towns. Other measures have included the providing of "farm equipment," such as the reported issuance since 1951 of some 95,700 farm implements of unspecified type to peasants of the Tibetan Autonomous District of Sikang Province. 49/ Likewise, in Sikang "agrotechnical" stations have supposedly been set up in 12 hsien (counties). 50/ Many Communist attempts to modernize agricultural techniques in the minority areas have also been reported.

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One of the over-all Chinese Communist goals is to reduce illiteracy. To that end educational facilities for both adults and children have been expanded, particularly in minority-inhabited areas. Increased school attendance in these areas has been reported. 51/ A report from the Northwest states that adult herdsmen and peasants are "actively attending winter schools and spare-time schools." 52/ Undoubtedly liberal dosages of Communist doctrine are mixed with the "three R's." On 15 January 1953 a Nationalities Publishing House was established to translate and publish "literature and pictorials." To facilitate education of minority peoples, textbooks have been printed in several non-Chinese languages, and efforts have been made to produce standardized written scripts for some of the lesser-known languages. There are also radio broadcasts in minority languages; by June 1952 five stations were broadcasting for short periods each day in Tibetan, Mongolian, Korean, and Uighur. Additional minority-language broadcasts reportedly are under consideration. 54/

Improvement in health standards is another Communist aim. Among members of "good-will missions" sent to remote areas with gifts of salt, clothing, and similar essentials are doctors who offer treatment to minority people. Vaccinations and basic sanitary measures have been introduced, and health stations have been established.

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The Chinese Communists have seemingly observed the social and religious customs of minorities. An order was issued in December 1950, for example, "in deference to established custom of the Muslims," exempting Muslims from the slaughter tax on beef and mutton consumed by Muslim communities during their three major festivals of the year. 55/ In the various training schools for minority cadres, the Communists have encouraged observance of festivals and religious holidays, the wearing of costumes of minority groups, and other deference to minority customs and traditions. 56/

Land reform has been a primary Communist objective in the creation of "New China." As Chou En-lai stated in a speech of 4 February 1953, "except for a few minority nationality areas, land reform has been completed." 57/ In minority-inhabited areas where the economy is derived in whole or in part from animal husbandry, land reform is not contemplated. Communist sources state that land holdings of Muslim mosques and of lamasaries likewise are not to be expropriated. 58/ 59/ Obviously, in areas where shifting agriculture and hunting are the main occupations, land reform is not feasible. In minority areas where the land and the economy are suitable, land reform has progressed slowly. A Communist newspaper article of 15 December 1952 reports that land reform was just beginning in Sinkiang Province. 60/ In some autonomous areas, land reform appears to be a prerequisite to the granting of "regional autonomy." Land reform was completed

in most of the West Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous District before the district was established in December 1952.

There are reports that in conjunction with the land-reform program some minority peoples are to be moved from the mountains to lowland areas. A November 1951 resolution adopted by the Central-South China Military and Administrative Committee refers to this policy as follows:

In areas where agrarian reform is in progress, where conditions permit, the Chinese (han) peasants shall be persuaded into reserving a portion of the land for the peasants of the national minorities from the mountains to come down and settle on the plains with access to the land reserved for them. As to the national minority elements who preferred to remain in their mountain homes, every assistance shall be given them in a planned manner for the development of production. 61/

A news report of January 1953 stated that when some 5,000 Miao and Yao people moved into lowland areas they "were warmly received by Han and Chuang peasants who helped them to build new homes and to do farm work." 62/ A major miracle in human behavior must have occurred in land-hungry China if the tribespeople were "warmly received" by their Chinese brothers!

C. Number, Types, and Administrative Relationships

Establishment of regional autonomy in minority-nationality areas antedated the espousal of principles in the Common Program. Several autonomous areas, notably the Inner Mongolia Autonomous

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Region, were established between 1946 and 1949.* After the promulgation of the Common Program and before the issuance of the General Minority Program of 8 August 1952, a reported 130 autonomous units, with a total population of 4,500,000, had been established in Communist China. The number has since increased to over 170, with an estimated population of 12,000,000 to 15,000,000. All autonomous units above the hsien level and most at the hsien level are believed to be located on the accompanying map, CIA 12667. Little information is available as to the number and location of autonomous units below the level of the hsien.

As defined in Article 7 of the General Minority Program (Appendix A), each autonomous unit will be at an administrative level comparable to ordinary units in the Chinese administrative system. At the highest administrative level is the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR), analagous in certain respects to the six major administrative areas of Communist China. The present administrative status of Tibet and Sinkiang is unclear, although both presumably will enjoy "regional autonomy" at the administrative level of the IMAR at some future date. The next highest administrative unit is the special

*It is not unusual for the Communists to experiment, without legal authority or with only broad policy directives, prior to legalizing and standardizing a particular program.

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district, which is under the immediate jurisdiction of the province and normally controls between 5 and 15 hsien. Thirteen autonomous units at special district level have been organized. Although their aggregate area is large (see map CIA 12667), most of it is sparsely inhabited. There are believed to be about 40 autonomous units at the hsien level. Beneath the hsien are several hundred autonomous units at the ch'ü (district or sub-county) and hsiang (administrative village) levels. Ch'ü occur in the larger hsien and consist of 10 or more hsiang, which in turn comprise villages with a total population generally below 3,000. Within an autonomous unit at the hsien level or higher, there may be an indefinite number of autonomous units at lower administrative levels. Usually a number of autonomous governments are organized at the ch'ü or hsiang level and are later incorporated into a larger autonomous unit, although apparently retaining their separate identity.

Based upon the number and distribution of minority groups, autonomous regions are divided into the following four types, which are similar to those described in the General Minority Program: (A) areas inhabited almost entirely by one minority group; (B) areas with one minority group predominating, but with smaller groups included; (C) areas inhabited by two or more minority groups in approximately equal numbers; and (D) areas inhabited primarily by Han Chinese but with concentrations of minority people. Little information is available about the last type of autonomous unit, which usually is referred

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to as a "democratic coalition" government. An early 1953 report stated that some 380 democratic coalition governments existed in Southwest China alone. 63/ Apparently democratic coalition governments are to be established in areas where minorities total about 10 percent of the population. Non-Chinese are to be represented in the local government according to their population. 64/

As stated in Article 5 of the General Minority Program, autonomous units often include a number of settlements of Han Chinese within their boundaries. This occurs because minority groups generally inhabit the hill and slope lands while the Chinese almost invariably are concentrated in villages and cities of the lowland areas. Where concentrations of Chinese are interspersed with minority groups, the ordinary administrative organs of government found in areas occupied by the Han Chinese apparently continue to function.

III. The Major Autonomous Units

A. The Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR)

The Inner Mongolia Autonomous Government (IMAG) was established on 1 May 1947, controlling an area that later came to be known as the IMAR. The territory of the IMAR fluctuated considerably between 1947 and 1950. The IMAR includes only a part of what geographically is called Inner Mongolia.* As now constituted, the IMAR consists of western Manchuria and areas formerly parts of northern Jehol and Chahar Provinces. Accurate statistics for the area and population are not available; the area is estimated at 600,000 square kilometers, and the customary Communist population figure is 2,400,000, of which slightly over 800,000 are reported to be Mongols. Considering the area covered by the IMAR, previous estimates of Mongol population indicate a total figure of perhaps 1,200,000. Although most of the IMAR is open pasture land, extensive areas in the south and east are inhabited by Chinese agriculturists, and forested mountains occur in the north and east.

Administratively, the IMAR is divided into eastern and western districts. 65/ The eastern district with headquarters at Wang-yeh-miao, called by the Communists Wu-lan-hao-t'e (46°05'N, 122°05'E),

*Inner Mongolia is a somewhat loosely used geographical term defining Mongol-inhabited areas of Ningsia, Suiyüan, Jehol, and Chahar as those provinces were organized under the Nationalist Government. The western Manchurian portion of the IMAR is sometimes called "Eastern Mongolia" or "Eastern Inner Mongolia."

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has jurisdiction over the four Mongol leagues of Hu-na (Huna), Hsing-an (Hsingan), Che-li-mu (Jerim), and Chao-wu-ta (Jo-oda). Total population of this district is 1,260,000 people. 66/ Presumably the western district, which has jurisdiction over the leagues of Cha-ha-erh (Chahar) and Hsi-lin-kuo (Silingol), is administered from Kuei-sui (40°47'N, 111°37'E), capital of the IMAR and likewise of Suiyüan Province. In all, the IMAR administers 6 leagues, 33 banners, 7 hsien, and 4 municipalities.

The creation of the IMAR is an additional stage in the long and complex history of political interrelationships between Mongols and Chinese. During the past 50 years political tension has increased owing to (1) the rapid and continued expansion of Chinese agricultur-
alists into Mongol grazing lands, (2) the intensification of Mongol nationalism caused by the establishment in Outer Mongolia of the so-called Mongolian People's Republic, and (3) the chaotic military and political situation between 1931 and 1948 when Chinese Nationalists, Chinese Communists, and Japanese were seeking control of Mongol-inhabited areas.

Chinese Nationalist policy generally followed the old "divide and rule" tactics, as for example in 1928 when Inner Mongolia was incorporated into the Chinese provincial system, thus hindering any pan-Mongol movement in China. The Japanese conquest of Manchuria in 1932 altered the situation. Posing as protectors of Mongol interests

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against Chinese encroachment, the Japanese established semi-autonomous Mongol provinces. Union of western and eastern Mongols was never achieved during the period of Japanese occupation. In this period Mongol factions were allied or in sympathy with the Japanese, the Chinese Communists, the Chinese Nationalists, and the Mongols of Outer Mongolia.

Following World War II, in 1945, an Inner Mongolia Autonomous Movement Association (IMAMA) came into being under the leadership of Yün Tse (Ulanfu), a Moscow-Yenan trained Mongol and member of the Chinese Communist Party. The IMAMA cleverly succeeded in framing a program acceptable to various Mongol factions and then, through familiar Communist practice, wrested control from non-Communist Mongol leaders. This led in April 1947 to the establishment of a Communist-sponsored Mongol People's Representative Assembly, which converted the IMAMA into the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Government (IMAG). Communist leaders hailed the establishment of the IMAR as the long-awaited unification of eastern and western Mongols. Since the IMAR embraces only part of the Mongol areas of China, it is clear that the old policy of dividing the Mongols into easily controlled units has been followed once again.

Chinese Communist control of the IMAG is vested in a few trusted Party members holding key interlocking governmental posts. Thus Yün Tse is not only Chairman of the IMAG, but also the recently appointed Governor of Suiyüan Province, member of the North China Administrative

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Committee, member of the Commission on Nationality Affairs of the State Administrative Council, and Commander of the Inner Mongolia-Suiyuan Military District, to name a few of his more important posts. Yun Tse, having spent most of his life outside of Inner Mongolia, reportedly speaks little or no Mongol and has no genuine ties within Inner Mongolia. 67/

Events of the past year indicate that Peking is attempting to integrate the IMAR more closely into Communist China. These events have included the transfer of the seat of Government of the IMAG to Kuei-sui, in Suiyuan Province,* outside the territorial limits of the IMAR, the division of the IMAR into eastern and western administrative districts to facilitate control of Mongol groups, and the strengthening of administrative ties between the North China Administrative Committee and the IMAG. Mongol goals in the past have included a union of all Mongols in Inner, Outer, and Eastern Mongolia. Traditionally, both Russians and Chinese have opposed pan-Mongol movements.

The Chinese Communists have boasted of their economic and cultural successes with the IMAR. Special attention has been devoted to techniques of animal husbandry, improvement in health conditions of both man and beast, and development of educational facilities.

*For most practical purposes Suiyuan Province appears to be a part of the IMAR, although the fiction of separate administration still exists.

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B. Tibet and Sinkiang

Both Tibet and Sinkiang have been promised regional autonomy at some unspecified date in the future. They cover large areas, which are sparsely populated by non-Chinese ethnic groups. Although they have been regarded as parts of China by Chinese governments, present and past, both have enjoyed considerable autonomy in the past, particularly Tibet. Tibet and Sinkiang are strategic areas in which the conflicting interests of China, the USSR, and to a lesser extent India and Pakistan are brought to bear.

1. Tibet*

The Chinese Communist occupation of the Tibetan capital of Lhasa in August 1951 signified a new chapter in the long and often turbulent relations between China and Tibet. Since Manchu armies captured Lhasa in 1720, the Chinese from time to time have attempted, generally with only limited success, to assert their authority over this vast and sparsely inhabited "roof of the world." The Chinese Nationalist Government considers Tibet an integral part of China; the Nationalist Government, however, exercised only

*The term Tibet as used in this report refers only to the area denoted Tibet on the accompanying maps, sometimes called Outer Tibet. The territory actually controlled by the Lhasa government in recent years, however, is much greater. The de facto Sino-Tibetan boundary had been along the Yangtze in eastern Sikang Province. An indeterminate amount of southwestern Tsinghai Province also had been under de facto control of Lhasa.

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nominal authority through a resident commissioner (1937-1949) stationed at the Tibetan capital. Soon after the Chinese Communists came into power, they announced their intention to "liberate" Tibet, the last large mainland area of China yet to be reclaimed. Accordingly, in late 1950, Chinese forces advanced towards Lhasa from Sikang, Tsinghai, and Sinkiang. The only resistance apparently encountered was at Ch'ang-tu in Sikang, and there the Tibetans offered only token resistance and quickly capitulated.

After the Chinese Communists occupied part of Tibet, a Tibetan delegation was sent to Peking at the "request" of the Communists and an agreement was signed on 23 May 1951. The agreement stipulated that Tibet should have the "right" to "national regional autonomy" under the direction of the Central People's Government.* Other points in the agreement provided that Communist China would control the external relations of Tibet and that the Tibetan Army would be integrated into the People's Liberation Army. Furthermore, it was stipulated that the existing political system should be retained, and the established status, powers, and functions of the Dalai and

*Although no official reports have as yet indicated that Tibet has been granted regional autonomy, Chinese Communist maps dated 1952 and the 1952 People's Handbook show and list Tibet as an "autonomous region." The latest Chinese Communist map, dated March 1953, however, does not show Tibet as an autonomous region.

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Panchen Lamas were not to be altered.* This agreement was not implemented until October 1951 when it was officially ratified by the Tibetan National Assembly.

Little current information is available on conditions in Tibet. Chinese Communist military forces in Tibet are estimated at 20,000 troops. 68/ Reports indicate that Chinese Communist soldiers are extremely circumspect in their relations with Tibetans. Communist sources have told of efforts to improve health standards, agricultural and economic productivity, and cultural conditions. Tibet reportedly is divided into three administrative zones: (1) a western zone under the control of the Panchen Lama, (2) a central zone under the Dalai Lama, and (3) an eastern zone under Ngabou, head of the 1951 Tibetan delegation to Peking. 69/

The Peking radio recently quoted from an address by Mao Tse-tung to a Tibetan mission visiting the Chinese Communist capital. Several remarks were significant as an indication of the direction Communist policy is taking in Tibet. Mao stated that Tibet is "too thinly populated" and that the present population should be increased to 5,000,000 and eventually to 10,000,000. 70/ Whether this increase

*Traditionally Tibet has had a theocratic form of government, with the supreme spiritual and temporal powers vested in the Dalai Lama. The Panchen Lama also possesses great spiritual powers; his temporal powers, however, are slight and subordinate to those of the Dalai Lama.

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in population is to be made through a rise in the indigenous birth rate or through Chinese colonization is not clear. In the past, Tibetans have strongly resisted Chinese colonization of traditional Tibetan lands. Regarding land reform, Mao reportedly stated that "in minority nationality areas, it is for the minorities themselves to decide" whether land reform should be implemented. 71/ As for Tibet, Mao stated that "it is as yet premature to speak of distributing land" and the "Tibetan people themselves must decide whether it is to be distributed or not in the future." 72/ Mao said that the "economy and culture also need development" and religion is to be protected. 73/ These remarks of Mao Tse-tung indicate the extremely cautious policy that the Chinese Communists are observing in their attempts to placate the Tibetans.

The Communist policy of observing local customs and the programs to develop education and improve health, cultural, and economic conditions are, of course, in line with previously announced Chinese Communist policy towards all minority groups in China. The Chinese Communists appear to have secured complete control over most of Tibet. The comparatively small Communist military forces stationed in Tibet, the difficult supply routes from China, and the warlike nature of many Tibetan tribes indicate that the Chinese Communists are taking more than usual pains not to antagonize their Tibetan "brothers."

2. Sinkiang

After "liberating" Sinkiang Province in late 1949, the Chinese Communists were confronted with numerous obstacles to their plan of integrating Sinkiang effectively into the Chinese Communist administrative system. These obstacles included a population 94 percent non-Chinese, of which most are ethnically akin to the inhabitants of contiguous Soviet areas. The vast majority of these non-Chinese peoples are Muslims, who in the past have been least tractable to Chinese authority. During most of its history as a Chinese province, Sinkiang has been misgoverned and exploited; some of its provincial governors were practically independent of the Central Government. The influence of the USSR has been strong in Sinkiang, particularly between 1933 and 1942; Soviet troops and planes were used to help quell a Muslim revolt in the early 1930's. Also, a so-called East Turkestan Autonomous Republic with Soviet support was established in the northwestern section of the province in 1944 after it became clear that the policy of the Sinkiang provincial government had changed from pro-Russian to pro-Nationalist Chinese.

The Chinese Communists have followed the same basic program toward minorities in Sinkiang as in other minority-inhabited areas of China. Because of the many obstacles encountered, however, they appear to have carried out a much more intensive education-propaganda campaign in Sinkiang than elsewhere to acquaint the people with their program. As Burkhan (Pao Erh-han), chairman of Sinkiang Province, stated

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in a report of 1 January 1953, "the various nationalities in Sinkiang have received a penetrating education in patriotism and internationalism, [which has] greatly enhanced their political consciousness." 74/ Methods used in this "penetrating education" have included the reported publication of some 2,600,000 books and periodicals, including such Sinkiang best sellers as the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (35 separate editions and 354,000 copies issued). 75/ A reported 939,000 textbooks were compiled, translated, and published in 1952. 76/ The usual Chinese Communist efforts in the fields of agriculture, public health, and industry have been recorded. Burkhan's 1 January 1953 report is filled with glowing accounts of "amazing achievements" in Sinkiang, but little factual information is given beyond the usual percentage increases.

With the organization of a preparatory committee for minority regional autonomy in September 1952, the implementation of regional autonomy in Sinkiang on an administrative level probably comparable to the IMAR seemed near at hand. The objectives of this preparatory committee included "broadening propaganda and education on the implementation of minority regional autonomy" and "investigating and studying relations of minorities . . . as well as requirements for economic development and their historical background." Autonomy was not to be implemented, however, until after land reform had been completed. 77/

Land reform in Sinkiang reportedly began in December 1952. A Communist press notice of that date stated that "landlords' land in 59 out of 78 counties [hsien] will be distributed to the peasants of various nationalities between this winter and next spring -- a period in which cultivation is not undertaken." 78/ A November 1952 Communist news release told of large numbers of minority people being trained to administer the regional autonomous government of Sinkiang after its establishment. The news report also stated that more than half the top government posts were held by minority people, but the posts were not specified. 79/ Chinese Communist policy has been to place only minority people devoted to the Communist cause in positions of responsibility.

C. Autonomous Units at the Special District Level

As of May 1953 11 autonomous units at the special district administrative level had been established; two others were in preparatory stages. The information available for the individual autonomous districts varies greatly. The Thai Autonomous District of Yunnan Province is discussed in greatest detail because of the considerable amount of information available on it, the political significance of the district, and the general similarity of the methods employed by the Communists in organizing, establishing, and operating the Thai Autonomous District to those used for other autonomous units.

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All available information as to the area, population, percentage of dominant minority group, and name of the chairman for each autonomous district is presented in Appendix B of this report.

1. Thai Autonomous District in Yünnan

In late January 1953 a Thai Autonomous District, with its capital at Ch'e-li (21°59'N, 100°49'E), was established in southwestern Yünnan Province. This unit has an area of about 20,000 square kilometers and consists of the hsien of Ch'e-li, Fo-hai, Nan-chiao, and Chen-yüeh, and unspecified parts of the hsien of Chiang-ch'eng, Ssu-mao, Ning-chiang, and Liu-shun. Nan-chiao, Fo-hai, and part of Ch'e-li hsien border Burma; Chen-yüeh and parts of Ch'e-li and Chiang-ch'eng hsien border Laos; and a small part of Chiang-ch'eng hsien borders Vietnam. Total population of the Thai autonomous unit is reported to be 200,000 people consisting of "47 nationalities." Persons of the Thai nationality group are estimated to comprise 70 percent of the total. 80/ The Chairman of the People's Government of the Thai Autonomous District is of Thai nationality and has been reported variously to be Chao Chun-hsin, Tao Tsun-hsin, Tao Shih-tung, and Chao Khum Suk.

The Thai Autonomous District is an area of scattered low plains and bordering mountains bisected by the Mekong River. This area is known as Sibsong Panna, a regional name signifying the union of 12 Thai tribes, and has remained relatively isolated from the main

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currents of Chinese history. Sibsong Panna long has held a position of nominal independence from Chinese administration. As late as 1894, the date of the Sino-British boundary agreement, this area was recognized as a semi-independent buffer state. The author of a detailed study of the area has stated that the people of Sibsong Panna are "not only a group of tribes, of an ethnographical category, but they themselves constitute a nation, occupying a common territory and speaking a common language. Moreover, they maintain their own economic system, and their culture reveals national psychological characteristics." 81/

The evolution of the Thai Autonomous District apparently has followed a pattern similar to that observed in founding other autonomous units. As related by the New China News Agency (NCNA), in the past two years nationality work teams of over 2,000 persons helped establish three Thai-nationality autonomous hsiang, so as to afford examples to the minority people of "democratic political construction." Preparations for establishment of the Thai Autonomous District apparently were slow and carefully planned, designed to gain maximum public support prior to the actual implementation of so-called regional autonomy. The new members of the autonomous government, at their inauguration, made the following pledges: to learn from the Han Chinese and the example of Han Chinese cadres so as to guide the Thai people; to smash sabotage activities of American imperialists

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and special agents of Chiang Kai-shek; and to strengthen defense of the fatherland and construct a new Sibsong Panna under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, Chairman Mao Tse-tung, and the Central People's Government. The majority of the government council members are Thai; a Han Chinese is listed as one of the five vice chairmen. The Chairman, Chao Chun-hsin, is reported by NCNA to have been deputy director of the Pu-erh Special District (formerly Ning-erh Special District) in Yunnan. 82/ If true, this would indicate that Chao is a trusted and experienced Communist administrator.

Since the establishment of the Thai Autonomous District, considerable concern has been voiced, particularly in Thailand, as to ulterior motives the Chinese Communists may have had in its creation. 83/84/85/ Most speculations have concerned themselves with the possibility that tribal nationalism among all Thai groups may be fostered, thus creating dissident movements in Burma, Thailand, and Laos. It has also been feared that political refugees, such as former Thai Premier Pridi, may use the Thai area of China as a political haven from which to direct propaganda appeals to Thailand.

The Thai Autonomous District is but one of many similar autonomous units, and its creation is consistent with present and past Chinese Communist policy toward all minority groups. The Thai Autonomous District appears to be welded effectively into the Chinese administrative pattern, and its "autonomy" is probably no greater than that

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possessed by an ordinary administrative unit. The creation of an autonomous unit in an area of long-standing political, economic, and cultural homogeneity is not unique; several other autonomous units have been organized in areas that were nominally independent political and cultural entities. The location of the Thai Autonomous District in the Burma-China-Laos border area is important considering the large number of ethnically related people inhabiting neighboring nations. The combined ethnic and historical factors present afford opportunities that could be exploited to further Chinese Communist policies in Southeast Asia.

2. Tibetan Autonomous Districts

Centered about the juncture of Sikang, Szechwan, Kansu, and Tsinghai Provinces are three Tibetan autonomous units and a fourth in the process of being organized, all at the special district administrative level. As can be seen from accompanying map CIA 12667, these units are largely contiguous and embrace an extensive area, roughly estimated to be about 500,000 square kilometers. In this vast territory live approximately 1,500,000 people, of whom about 1,100,000 are Tibetans or of Tibetan descent. Most of the area is a combination of mountains and high plateau country in which nomadic herding is the principal occupation. Since more information is available on the Sikang Tibetan Autonomous District than on the other three, that unit is discussed in greatest detail.

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The first of these autonomous units, the Sikang Tibetan Autonomous District, was established in eastern Sikang Province in November 1950, when political and military measures were being directed against Tibet. This autonomous area may have been created at that time to allay Tibetan fears that their traditional independence would be taken away. The district extends over some 175,000 square kilometers west from the Yangtze (known in this area as the Ching-sha Chiang or Golden Sands River) to or near the Szechwan border on the east.* As stated previously, the Yangtze in the past has served as the de facto boundary between Chinese and Tibetan authority. The area is populated predominantly by Tibetans, reportedly 560,000 of a total of 700,000. Administratively, the Tibetan Autonomous District in Sikang controls 20 hsien. The Chairman of the autonomous government is a Tibetan called Sans-rygas-ye-shes (Chinese name T'ien Pao), who joined the Chinese Communists in 1935 as a youth when the Red Army entered eastern Sikang during their Long March. 86/ He reportedly also holds important posts in the Sikang provincial government and in the Southwest Administrative Committee.

Adjoining the Sikang Tibetan Autonomous District is the Northwest Szechwan Tibetan Autonomous District, set up in late December 1952. Numerous tribes of Tibetan descent, such as the Ch'iang, Hsi-fan, and Gia-rung, who possess a combined or fused Tibetan-Chinese culture, inhabit this mountainous area. 87/

*For more details on boundaries of the Sikang Tibetan Autonomous District, see map CIA 12384, available at the CIA Map Library.

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The Yü-shu Tibetan Autonomous District, in southwestern Tsinghai, was organized in February 1952. This autonomous unit is large, covering perhaps a third of Tsinghai Province, but very sparsely populated by nomadic Tibetan tribes who reportedly number about 70,000. 88/

A recent Chinese Communist news release tells of the establishment of a preparatory committee for the organization of a South Kansu Tibetan Autonomous District. This new autonomous unit will absorb several smaller autonomous units, such as the Hsi-ho and Cho-ni Tibetan areas.

3. Other Autonomous Districts

The Liang-shan Yi Autonomous District was established in southeastern Sikang Province in October 1952 for some 700,000 Yi-chia (Lolo) people. This autonomous unit covers about 12,000 square kilometers, including most of the area known as "Independent Lolo Land," the mountainous retreat of several hundred thousand Yi-chia who in the past have remained aloof and independent of Chinese administration. Part of this so-called Independent Lolo Land extends across the border into southwestern Szechwan. A recent Communist news release tells of the forming of preparatory committees for autonomy in this area, and of the plan to include the area with the Liang-shan Yi Autonomous District in Sikang. 89/

The general Communist measures of first forming small "model" autonomous units and of establishing state trading companies and mobile

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health teams have been carried out in the Liang-shan area. The Yi-chia have been noted for their warlike spirit and their intertribal feuds. According to a recent NCMA release from Ya-an, Sikang provincial capital, however, the situation has now changed and "unprecedented unity pervades the whole region since over forty tribal chiefs and two hundred and thirty representatives signed a regional pact of unity, before the portrait of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, pledging themselves to put a permanent end to armed strife." 90/

In December 1952 the West Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous District was established, comprising 33 hsien, unfortunately not identified, and some 6,000,000 people. It is possible that part of this autonomous unit is contiguous with Vietnam. About two-thirds of the population consists of Chuang, a Thai-dialect group. Unlike the culturally homogenous Thai of southern Yunnan, the Chuang differ little, socially and economically, from the Chinese. Most of them are in various stages of cultural absorption by the Chinese. Land reform was carried out in 20 of the 33 hsien before regional autonomy was granted; most Chuang live on low plains and grow rice as their staple crop.

In May 1952 the West Huanan Miao Autonomous District was organized. Little is known about this area beyond the fact that it contains 10 hsien with a population of 1,500,000, of which only 300,000 are Miao. Available information indicates that only a few of the southern hsien in this autonomous area have concentrations of Miao people; why the largely Chinese-inhabited northern hsien were included in the unit is not clear.

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The Hainan Li-Miao Autonomous District was established in July 1952 in the hilly, forested south-central part of the island. The population of this autonomous unit is 270,000 with the majority Li, a Thai-related people. The Communist policy of currying favor with minority groups may be important on Hainan because of its strategic location as a base for possible future operations against the Chinese mainland.

The Yen-pien Korean Autonomous District composed of five hsien with a population of 730,000, including over 500,000 Koreans, was established in September 1952. It occupies a fertile basin surrounded on three sides by mountains. The Chairman of the District, Chu Te-hai, was in 1952 the only Korean member of the Northeast People's Government Committee. 91/ There have been speculations that the Yen-pien area might eventually be incorporated into North Korea to bolster the North Korean regime, 92/ but there are no indications that Chinese Communist policy would permit the absorption of an historical portion of China by another nation.

The two Mongol leagues of Suiyüan Province, the Wu-lan-ch'a-pu (Ulan-chap) and I-k'o-chao (Ikechou), were organized in 1950 and 1951, respectively, into special district level autonomous units. The 2 leagues include large areas of steppe and desert land. Total population is small, estimated as somewhat over 100,000 people. Administratively, the 2 leagues control 13 banners and 1 hsien.

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It was announced in March 1952 that the Hsi-hai-ku Muslim Autonomous District was to be established in eastern Kansu Province. This autonomous unit will cover an area of about 23,000 square kilometers and will control several hsien with a population totaling nearly 500,000, of which 47 percent are Muslims. Although Muslim autonomous units previously have been organized at the hsien level and below, the new division will be the first of this size and administrative level.

D. Autonomous Units at the Hsien and Sub-Hsien Levels

The number of autonomous units at the hsien and sub-hsien levels is not known. More than 40 autonomous units, largely at the hsien level, are located on accompanying map CIA 12667. Little detailed information is available for these autonomous units; that which has been released substantiates previous knowledge as to Communist measures utilized in implementing regional autonomy.

The establishment in September 1950 of a Tung-hsiang autonomous area at the hsien level in eastern Kansu is of interest since the Tung-hsiang, or "East Country" Muslims, long have resisted Chinese attempts at administration and have frequently participated in Muslim revolts.

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IV. Attitudes and Reactions

The degree of success attained by the Chinese Communists in implementing their policies toward minority groups is extremely difficult to assess. The fragmentary information available is from two main sources: (1) comments of returned missionaries, businessmen, and travelers, and (2) speeches by Communist leaders and published Communist news reports.

Most persons returning from Communist China have noted the generally favorable treatment received by minorities. Their comments likewise have stressed the fact that the Communists are indoctrinating tribal leaders and training likely candidates in special minority-nationality training schools to work in minority areas as administrators and instructors. Available evidence indicates that the Communists have been at least partially successful in this endeavor.

A 1951 report from a Yi-chia (Lolo) area of southwestern Szechwan stated that the Yi-chia did not enjoy the Communist instruction and that while Communism might be all right for the Han Chinese, the Yi-chia would stick to their own ways. 93/ Another source in commenting upon the minority training schools in Tsinghai said that basic dislike and fear of the Communist regime among Tibetan nomads was very strong. 94/ Still another source reported that the Tibetans in eastern Sikang were being treated with circumspection as of early 1952. According to this report a few have become violently and

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vocally pro-Communist, while others have taken a "we don't care who governs us; we'll get along" attitude. 95/ Several returned missionaries have commented upon the attitude of the Lisu toward the Communists; the Lisu are a small tribal group inhabiting the Salween Valley country along the Upper Burma-Yunnan border. A report of January 1952 stated that the Lisu were being converted to Communism more slowly than the Chinese. The same source also stated that "the Lisu seem to respond quite readily to Communism," in part because they were oppressed by the Chinese in the past. 96/ Another report of early 1952 stated that the "Black Lisu," a less culturally-advanced and independent element of the Lisu ethnic group, have remained aloof from Communist overtures; other Lisu groups, however, reportedly have accepted the Communists. 97/

Speeches by Communist leaders have revealed that minority reactions to the Communist program have not always been "correct." At the second conference of the Commission of the Affairs of Nationalities of the Central People's Government (CPG), a number of illuminating speeches were presented. An excerpt from a speech delivered by Wan Feng, Chairman of the Nationalities Affairs Committee of Northwest China, in December 1951, follows:

Because a segment of the minority nationality masses at first failed to understand the promotion of regional autonomy, many of them incorrectly believed that after regional autonomy is in effect, the Communist Party must leave, and they feared that after the departure of the Communist Party there would be no policy on how to carry out autonomy. Those who still embraced

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feelings of "narrow nationalism" thought that after establishing regional autonomy, they could go their own way independently and leave the Communist Party. Therefore, it is absolutely imperative that [a] systematic educational and propaganda campaign must be expanded among the masses to advance regional autonomy collectively. 98/

A speech made at the same conference by Ulanfu, Chairman of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, voices similar sentiments. For example, Ulanfu stated that "some persons are of the opinion that regional autonomy is independence without need of leadership by higher People's Government." 99/ Ulanfu also remarked that "doubts, worries and misunderstandings" will be removed by continued "explanation and education." 100/ The Chairman of the Commission of the Affairs of Nationalities of the CPG, Li Wei-han, in a speech at the same conference, devoted a section of his discourse to various questions presumably raised. The questions generally voiced some doubt as to the wisdom and necessity of the minority nationality program. Li Wei-han's stock rejoinder was that questions such as these "impede" and "interfere" with the introduction and implementation of regional autonomy policy. 101/

Criticism of the spirit and methods employed by Chinese cadres in minority areas has also been voiced. Ulanfu, in his speech, remarked that "Han cadres, lacking an over-all correct understanding . . . entertained various doubts and worries about the effectuation of nationalities regional autonomy." 102/ The annual report of Kwangsi Province for 1952 also indicated that the cadres have not fully

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understood their duty. For example, it was stated that study of the national minorities policy had been inadequate, and insufficient attention had been paid to developing area autonomy. 103/ The Communist cure for these doubts, worries, and insufficient study is continued "explanation and education."

S-E-C-R-E-TV. Conclusion

The establishment of so-called autonomous governments in the minority-inhabited areas of China has been but a part of a broad Communist program designed to gain absolute control of mainland China. The Communists have curbed the traditional policy of oppressing and exploiting non-Chinese groups, and have instituted a program of political, economic, and social reforms designed to gain the support of minority people. The central point of the Communist-inspired minority program has been the promise of "autonomy" for minority areas. Although the Communists have proclaimed their adherence to the ideals of autonomy, in practice the customary Chinese "divide and rule" technique of splitting minority groups into small, politically impotent elements has been followed. A good example has been the establishment of four separate Tibetan autonomous units with largely contiguous boundaries. Autonomous units have no real autonomy, and all evidence indicates that each unit is firmly welded into the Chinese administrative system.

Chinese Communist minority policies are of great importance in the peripheral regions of China -- Tibet, Sinkiang, and Inner Mongolia. These regions had long been political vacuums, and Chinese authority was, in most parts, merely nominal; as a result Soviet influence expanded, particularly in Sinkiang. The reassertion of Chinese control forecasts new political alignments in these strategic areas.

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The establishment of autonomous units in border areas, particularly Yunnan Province, is viewed with considerable concern by bordering countries, since these autonomous units consist of people ethnically related to people in adjacent nations. These autonomous units could be used to inspire dissident elements in bordering states and to further Chinese Communist designs in southeast Asia and elsewhere.

In advancing their policies towards non-Chinese peoples, the Communists have stressed improvement in educational facilities, health conditions, and agricultural productivity, and other measures designed to civilize minority groups. The intensive training of political workers in the Communist doctrine will enable the Communists to replace the old leading classes, the most important element traditionally opposed to Chinese domination. Although the Communists have encouraged cultural identity among the non-Chinese groups and have denounced "pan-Hanism" among the Han Chinese, the various social, political, and economic reforms designed to educate and civilize non-Chinese peoples will probably result in gradual cultural assimilation of many of the minority people.

The most significant result of the Chinese Communist minority program is that within only four years and with an apparent minimum of military difficulty the Communists apparently have been able to secure control of the minority-inhabited areas of China, including strategic border areas.

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APPENDIX A

THE GENERAL MINORITY PROGRAM

(Released by New China News Agency on 12 August 1952)

Peking, Aug. 12 -- The regional autonomy program of the People's Republic of China passed at the 125th administrative meeting of the Government Administration Council on Feb. 22, 1952, and approved at the 18th meeting of the Central People's Government Council on Aug. 8, 1952:

Chapter I -- General Principles:

Art. 1 -- This program was enacted in accordance with Articles 9, 50, 51, 52, and 53 of the Common Program adopted at the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Art. 2 -- The autonomous regions of the various nationalities are an integral part of the People's Republic of China. The self-governing organs of the autonomous regions of the various nationalities shall be regional governments of the top level under the over-all leadership of the Central People's Government, and (shall be placed under) the leadership of the People's Governments of a higher level.

Art. 3 -- The Common Program adopted at the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference points out the main road toward achieving unity at the present stage among the various nationalities. The people of the autonomous regions should, while handling their internal affairs, follow this main road.

Chapter 2 -- Autonomous Regions:

Art. 4 -- In areas inhabited by various national minorities, an autonomous region may be designated with reference to the existing relations among the nationalities, the conditions for economic development, and historical background:

A -- An autonomous region made up of areas inhabited by one minority nationality.

B -- An autonomous region made up of areas inhabited by one dominating minority nationality, including autonomous areas and localities inhabited by a small population of other minority nationalities.

C -- An autonomous region made up of areas inhabited by two or more minority nationalities; whether it is necessary to establish independent

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autonomous areas in such an autonomous region depends upon existing conditions and the desire of the nationalities concerned.

Art. 5 -- Based on local economic and political requirements, and with reference to the historical backgrounds, respective minority autonomous regions may each include certain areas, cities, and towns inhabited by those of the Han nationality. Administrative governmental organs in the Han-inhabited areas in respective minority autonomous regions shall follow the present system being implemented throughout the Nation and shall not effect regional autonomy. However, in areas where the population of the Han nationality is exceptionally large, a democratic confederated government of nationalities should be founded.

Art. 6 -- The boundaries of autonomous regions shall be designated according to Articles 4 and 5 of this program. If the boundaries cannot be properly designated when an autonomous region is established, temporary boundaries, to be adjusted later, may be designated.

Art. 7 -- The administrative status of an autonomous region shall be equivalent to that of a hsiang, ch'ü, hsien, special district, or higher, depending upon the population and size of the region.

Art. 8 -- Except in special cases, the name of an autonomous region shall follow the name of the nationality or the place.

Art. 9 -- The designation and adjustment of boundaries of an autonomous region and the ascertainment of its administrative status and name shall be decided upon through consultations of the concerned People's Government of a higher level and the representatives of the concerned nationalities, and approved by the People's Government of a still higher level. Cases involving an autonomous area with the administrative status of a hsien or higher shall be submitted to the Government Administration Council of the Central People's Government for approval. Cases that have been approved by the various levels of People's Governments shall be reported through channels to the Government Administration Council of the Central People's Government for record.

Chapter 3 -- Self-governing Organs:

Art. 10 -- The self-governing organ of an autonomous region shall be the political organ of the people of an autonomous region.

Art. 11 -- The founding of a self-governing organ of an autonomous region shall be based on the principles of a democratic concentration system and people's assembly.

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Art. 12 -- Organizations of the People's Government of an autonomous region shall be mainly staffed with nationals of the region, in addition to a reasonable number of other nationalities and the Han nationality.

Art. 13 -- Except under special circumstances, the administrative status of an autonomous region shall decide to which organ a self-governing organ of an autonomous region shall be subordinated.

Chapter 4 -- Autonomous Rights:

Art. 14 -- The form of a self-governing organ of an autonomous region shall be based upon the desire of the majority and the leading personages of the nationalities of a region in which autonomy is practiced.

Art. 15 -- The self-governing organ of an autonomous region shall adopt a commonly known local language as the main instrument in exercising its power and discharging its duties. While dealing with a nationality that does not understand the designated language, the language of such nationality should be concurrently used.

Art. 16 -- The self-governing organ of an autonomous region may use the languages and dialects of the various nationalities to develop their respective cultural and educational activities.

Art. 17 -- The self-governing organ of an autonomous region may take the necessary measures to train national cadres who ardently love the Fatherland and maintain close relations with the local people.

Art. 18 -- The internal reform of an autonomous area shall be based upon the desire of the majority and the leading personages who maintain contact with the various nationalities.

Art. 19 -- Under the over-all financial system of the State, the self-governing organ of an autonomous region may take care of its own financial matters (in accordance with the rights granted by) the Central People's Government and higher level People's Governments.

Art. 20 -- Under the over-all (financial) system and economic planning of the State, the self-governing organ of an autonomous region may freely develop the local economic enterprises.

Art. 21 -- The self-governing organ of an autonomous region shall take necessary and appropriate measures to develop the cultural, educational, art, and health programs of the nationalities.

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Art. 22 -- In line with the military system of the State, the self-governing organ of an autonomous region may organize public security and militia forces of its own.

Art. 23 -- Within the limits of laws, ordinances, and autonomous rights prescribed by the Central People's Government and the People's Government of a higher level, the self-governing organ of an autonomous region may enact its own laws and submit them through channels to the People's Governments of the two higher levels for approval. The laws of an autonomous region approved by the various levels of People's Governments shall be reported through channels to the Government Administration Council of the Central People's Government for record.

Art. 24 -- The autonomous rights enumerated above shall be applicable in principle to all autonomous regions. The scope of application shall depend upon the corresponding administrative status of an autonomous region.

Chapter 5 -- Relations among the nationalities of an autonomous region:

Art. 25 -- The self-governing organ of an autonomous region shall insure equal rights among the various nationalities, teach them to respect one another's dialects, languages, customs, and religions, forbid prejudice against and oppression of one another, and outlaw any action which provokes disputes among the nationalities.

Art. 26 -- The self-governing organ of an autonomous region shall insure the freedom accorded by the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, namely, the freedom of thought, speech, press, assembly, association, communication, person, residence, travel, religion, and demonstration, irrespective of nationality. Also, people of all nationalities shall have the right to elect and be elected.

Art. 27 -- The self-governing organ of an autonomous region shall, in accordance with Art. 4 of this program, assist other national minorities in the region to practice local autonomy.

Art. 28 -- The self-governing organ in an autonomous region shall amply discuss all special problems concerning other nationalities in the region with the representatives of such nationalities.

Art. 29 -- The self-governing organ of an autonomous region shall teach and guide the people to unite and cooperate with all the

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nationalities in China and to love the People's Republic of China-- the large family of the various nationalities who love and cooperate with one another.

Chapter 6 -- [Title unknown]:

Art. 30 -- The People's Government of a higher level shall respect the autonomous rights of the nationalities of an autonomous region, and shall assist them to exercise such rights.

Art. 31 -- The People's Government of a higher level shall take into consideration the peculiarities and conditions attending present developments in an autonomous region so that its directives and instructions shall be both in line with the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and such peculiarities and conditions.

Art. 32 -- The People's Government of a higher level shall assist the self-governing organ of an autonomous region to systematically train local nationality cadres and to assign such cadres to local jobs in accordance with its needs.

Art. 33 -- The People's Government of a higher level shall assist an autonomous region in developing its political, economic, cultural, educational, and health programs.

Art. 34 -- The People's Government of a higher level shall adopt appropriate methods to introduce advanced experiences and progress of political, economic, and cultural construction to the people of an autonomous region.

Art. 35 -- The People's Government of a higher level shall teach and assist the various nationalities to establish the concepts of equality, friendliness, unity, and mutual aid among one another, and to rectify the various "isms" which favor dominating nationalities and narrow nationalism.

Chapter 7 -- Addenda:

Art. 36 -- Except in regions in which autonomy has been practised, the various regions in China inhabited by national minorities, where initial success toward achieving revolutionary order has been made, shall, based on the desires of the people of the various stratas, proceed with the establishment of regional autonomy. The convocation of people's representative conferences and other preparatory work may be done through preparatory organs set up for such purposes, or through appropriate existing organs.

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Art. 37 -- The name of an autonomous region provided for in Art. 8 and the special circumstances mentioned in Art. 13 of this program, in connection with the subordination of the self-governing organ of an autonomous region, shall be decided upon by the Government Administration Council of the Central People's Government, based upon the opinions submitted by the concerned provincial People's Government (administrative office -- NCNA), the People's Government of a large administrative area, or the autonomous People's Government of similar levels. The Government Administration Council of the Central People's Government may also decide upon the same matters without referring to such opinions.

Art. 38 -- Local autonomy measures to be followed by the national minorities in an area dominated by the Han nationality shall be decided upon by the Government Administration Council of the Central People's Government, based on the spirit of this program.

Art. 39 -- This program was proposed by the Nationality Affairs Commission of the Central People's Government at the second expanded meeting of the commission, passed by the Government Administration Council of the Central People's Government, and approved and promulgated for enforcement by the Central People's Government Council.

Art. 40 -- The authority to elaborate and amend this program shall rest with the Central People's Government.

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APPENDIX B

COMMUNIST AUTONOMOUS ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS

Name	Area a/ (Sq. Km.)	Total Population a/	Minority Group b/ e/	Date Established	Chairman (as of Date of Establishment)	Administrative Center	Administrative Level c/	Administrative Units Controlled	Type d/
INNER MONGOLIA AUTONOMOUS REGION	600,000	2,400,000	800,000 Mongols	1 May 1947	Ulanfu (Yün Tse)	Kuei-sui (40°47'N, 111°37'E)	Administrative area	6 leagues	B f/
Orochon Aut. Banner	Unknown	1,000	Orochon	1 Nov 1951	Unknown	Hsiao-erh-kou (50°10'N, 124°20'E)	Hsien	Unknown	A
NORTHEAST AREA									
Yen-pien Korean Aut. Dist.	29,395	730,000	543,000 Koreans	3 Sep 1952	Chu Te-hai	Yen-chi (42°53'N, 129°31'E)	Special district	Yen-chi, Ho-lung, Wang-ch'ing, Hun-ch'un, An-t'u Hsien.	B
Daghur Aut. Area	Unknown	11,000	5,000 Daghurs	18 Aug 1952	Mang-ha	Unknown	Sub-hsien	Unknown	B
Weng-chiu-t'ie (Ongniud) Aut. Banner	Unknown	12,000 g/	Mongol	Jan 1949	Unknown	Unknown	Hsien	Unknown	A
Ao-han (Aokhan) Aut. Banner	Unknown	Unknown	Mongol	Mar 1949	Unknown	Unknown	Hsien	Unknown	B
K'o-la-ch'in (Kharchin) Aut. Banner	Unknown	30,000 g/	Mongol	Oct 1947	Unknown	Unknown	Hsien	Unknown	B
K'o-la-ch'in-tao (Kharchin East)	Unknown	35,000 g/	Mongol	Sep 1946	Unknown	Unknown	Hsien	Unknown	B
NORTH CHINA AREA									
I-k'o-chao (Ikechou) Aut. League	Unknown	66,000 g/	Mongol	Jun 1951	Unknown	Tung-sheng (39°52'N, 109°59'E)	Special district	7 banners, 1 hsien	A
Wu-lan-ch'a-pu (Ulanchap) Aut. League	Unknown	52,500 g/	Mongol	1950	Unknown	Pao-t'ou (40°36'N, 110°03'E)	Special district	6 banners	B
Ta-ch'ang Aut. Area	Unknown	33,000	17,000 Muslims	Nov 1950	Liu Meng-hsien	Ta-ch'ang (39°53'N, 116°59'E)	Sub-hsien	Unknown	B
Kuei-sui Muslim Aut. Area	Unknown	Unknown	60 percent Muslims	Dec 1950	Unknown	Kuei-sui (40°47'N, 111°37'E)	Sub-hsien	Unknown	B

a/ Unless otherwise indicated, area and population statistics are taken from Chinese Communist sources.

b/ Where no percentage or total number of the dominant minority group is given, only the name of the dominant minority is listed. Most autonomous units include Han Chinese and lesser minority groups.

c/ Classification of autonomous units at the hsien and sub-hsien levels is sometimes arbitrary.

d/ Types of autonomous units, based in general on Communist data: (A) inhabited by one minority nationality; (B) one minority group predominant, but smaller groups also included; (C) consisting primarily of two minority groups; (D) inhabited primarily by Han Chinese but including concentrations of minority nationalities.

e/ Non-Communist estimates range as high as 1,200,000.

f/ Differentiation between types is often arbitrary.

g/ Estimated from pre-Communist statistics.

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Name	Area <u>a</u> / (Sq. Km.)	Total Population <u>a</u> / g/	Minority Group <u>b</u> / Tibetans	Date Established	Chairman (as of Date of Establishment)	Administrative Center	Administrative Level <u>c</u> / Hsien	Administrative Units Controlled	Type <u>d</u> / B
Hui Autonomous Area	Unknown	11,000	4,400 Muslims	Jan 1953	Pai Feng-kang	Unknown	Sub-hsien	Unknown	B
NORTHWEST AREA									
Yü-shu Tibetan Aut. Dist.	200,000 <u>h</u> / g/	70,000	Tibetan	12 Feb 1952	Drashi-tsewang- dorge	Yü-shu (33°01'N, 96°44'E)	Special district	Ch'eng-to, Nang- ch'ien, Yü-shu Hsien.	A
South Kansu Tibetan Aut. Dist.	Unknown	200,000	Tibetan	To be established	Unknown	Hsia-ho (35°10'N, 102°35'E)	Special district	Aut. Areas of Cho-ni, Hsia-ho, Lin-t'an; parts of Min, Hsi-ku, Wu-tu Hsien.	B
Hsi-hai-ku Muslim Aut. Dist.	23,000	490,000	47 percent Muslims	To be established	Unknown	Unknown	Special district	Hai-yüan, Hsi-chi, Ku-yüan Hsien; parts of Ching-ning, Lung-te Hsien.	B
A-la-shan (Alashan) Aut. Banner	120,000	40,000	30,000 Mongols	1950	Unknown	Ting-yuan-ying (38°50'N, 105°32'E)	Hsien	Unknown	B
O-chi-na (Edjene) Aut. Banner	100,000 <u>h</u> / g/	Unknown	Mongol	1950	Unknown	Unknown	Hsien	Unknown	A
Su-pei Aut. Area	Unknown	1,000 <u>g</u> / h/	Mongol	29 Jul 1950	Unknown	Chiang-chun-t'ai (northwestern Kansu)	Hsien	Unknown	A
T'ien-chu Tibetan Aut. Area	Unknown	Unknown	Tibetan	3 May 1950	Unknown	Wu-ch'iao-ling (approx. 37°11'N, 103°01'E)	Hsien	Unknown	B
Hai-yen Tibetan Aut. Area	Unknown	11,000	36 percent Tibetans	Nov 1952	Unknown	(At approx. 36°55'N, 100°55'E)	Hsien	Unknown	B
Kung-ho Kazak Aut. Area	Unknown	4,000	Kazak	Jul 1950	Unknown	Kung-ho (35°03'N, 100°44'E)	Hsien	Unknown	A
Tung-hsiang Aut. Area	Unknown	160,000	Muslim	25 Sep 1950	Unknown	So-nan-pa (35°38'N, 103°23'E)	Hsien	Hilly areas of Lin-hsia, Ning- ting, Ho cheng, Yung-ching Hsien.	A
T'ung-te Aut. Area	Unknown	25,000	80 percent Tibetans	21 Nov 1951	Tan-te-erh	T'ung-te (34°51'N, 100°56'E)	Hsien	Unknown	B
SOUTHWEST AREA									
Sikang Tibetan Aut. Dist.	175,000 <u>h</u> / g/	700,000	560,000 Tibetans	24 Nov 1950	Sans-rygas-ye- shes (T'ien Pao)	K'ang-ting (30°03'N, 102°02'E)	Special district	Shih-ch'ü, Teng-k'o, Te-ko, Pai-yü Kan-tzu, Li-ho Tao-fu, Tao-pa, Hsin-lung, Ch'ien-ning, K'ang-ting, Lu-ting, Ye-chiang, Li-tang, I-tun, Pa-tang, Te-jung, Hsiang-cheng, Tao-ch'eng, Chiu-lung Hsien.	B

h/ Estimated from Chinese Communist maps.

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S-E-C-R-E-T

Name	Area a/ (Sq. Km.)	Total Population a/	Minority Group b/	Date Established	Chairman (as of Date of Establishment)	Administrative Center	Administrative Level c/	Administrative Units Controlled	Type d/
Liang-shan Yi Aut. Dist.	12,000 h/	700,000	Yi-chia (Lolo)	1 Oct 1952	Hua-sha-mu-chi	Chao-chiao (28°13'N, 103°00'E)	Special district	Chao-chiao, P'u-lo, Chu-ten, Fu-hsiung, Mei-chi, Hsi yang, Chi-ko Hsien.	A
Northwest Szechwan Tibetan Aut. Dist.	35,000 h/	500,000	75 percent Tibetans	Dec 1952	Sans-rygar-ye-shes	Mao-hsien (31°41'N, 103°52'E)	Special district	Sung-p'an, Li, Mao, Mei- kung, Ch'ien- hua, Wen-ch'uan Hsien.	B
Thai Aut. Dist.	20,000	200,000	Thai	Jan 1953	Chao Chun-hsin	Ch'e-li (21°59'N, 100°49'E)	Special district	Ch'e-li, Fo-hai, Nan-chiao, Chen-yieh Hsien; parts of Ssu-ao, Ning-chiang, Chiang- ch'eng, Lu-shu Hsien.	B
P'ing-wu Tibetan Aut. Area	Unknown	Unknown	Tibetan	30 Jul 1950	Unknown	P'ing-wu (32°25'N, 104°36'E)	Hsien	Unknown	A
Lu-ting Democratic Coalition Area	Unknown	25,000 (est.)	Tibetan and Yi-chia	25 Oct 1952	Unknown	Lu-ting (29°56'N, 102°12'E)	Hsien	Unknown	D
Hung-ma8-ma-ku Yi Aut. Area	Unknown	Unknown	Yi-chia	19 Jan 1953	Unknown	Unknown	Hsien	Unknown	E
Mu-li Tibetan Aut. Area	Unknown	100,000	Tibetan	19 Feb 1953	Ta-chuan-hsiang- pei-chu-chien-pa.	Mu-li (28°12'N, 100°50'E)	Hsien	Unknown	B
Kung-shan Li-su Aut. Area	Unknown	6,000 (est.)	Li-su	Dec 1951	Unknown	Kung-shan (27°58'N, 98°38'E)	Hsien	Unknown	B
Pi-chiang Li-su Aut. Area	Unknown	12,000 (est.)	Li-su	Dec 1951	Unknown	Pi-chiang (26°58'N, 98°54'E)	Hsien	Unknown	B
Lu-ch'ian Democratic Coalition Area	Unknown	Unknown	Yi-chia and Miao	Apr 1951	Unknown	Lu-ch'ian (25°35'N, 102°30'E)	Hsien	Unknown	D
Wu-ting Democratic Coalition Area	Unknown	Unknown	Yi-chia and Miao	Apr 1951	Unknown	Wu-ting (25°33' N, 102°26'E)	Hsien	Unknown	D
Mi-lo Yi Aut. Area	Unknown	202,000	Yi-chia	1 Jan 1953	Unknown	Mi-lo (24°24'N, 103°27'E)	Hsien	Unknown	B
O-shan Aut. Area	Unknown	Unknown	57 percent Yi-chia	1951	Unknown	O-shan (24°11'N, 102°24'E)	Hsien	Unknown	B
Hsin-p'ing Democratic Coalition Area	Unknown	Unknown	Yi-chia and Thai	May 1951	Unknown	Hsin-p'ing (24°06'N, 101°58'E)	Hsien	Unknown	D
Yian-yang Democratic Coalition Area	Unknown	Unknown	Yi-chia and Thai	May 1951	Unknown	Yian-chiang (23°38'N, 101°59'E)	Hsien	Unknown	D
Lan-ts'ang Aut. Area	10,000	203,000	40 percent La-hu	7 Apr 1953	Unknown	Lan-ts'ang (22°37'N, 99°59'E)	Hsien	Unknown	B

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Name	Area a/ (Sq. Km.)	Total Population a/	Minority Group b/	Date Established	Chairman (As of Date of Establishment)	Administrative Center	Administrative Level c/	Administrative Units Controlled	Type d/
Hui-shui Aut. Area	Unknown	Unknown	Thai	1952	Unknown	Hui-shui (26°08'N, 106°36'E)	Hsien	Unknown	
Iu-shan Aut. Area	Unknown	Unknown	Miao	1952	Unknown	K'ai-li (26°34'N, 108°19'E)	Sub-hsien	Unknown	
T'ai-chiang Miao Aut. Area	Unknown	Unknown	Miao	Jan 1953	Unknown	T'ai-chiang (26°40'N, 108°19'E)	Hsien	Unknown	
Tan-chai Miao Aut. Area	Unknown	80,000	Miao	Dec 1952	Unknown	Tan-chia (26°13'N, 107°47'E)	Hsien	Unknown	
CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA AREA									
West Hunan Miao Aut. Dist.	19,000 h/	1,500,000	300,000 Miao	30 May 1952	Unknown	Yung-shun (29°00'N, 109°54'E)	Special district	Ch'ien-ch'eng, Fung-huang, Lu-ch'i, Lung-shun, Pao- ching, Sang-chih, Ta-yung, Yung-shun, Yung-hui, Ku- chang Hsien.	
Hainan Li-Miao Aut. Dist.	12,000 h/	270,000	Li and Miao	1 Jul 1952	Wang Kuo-hsing	Lo-tung (18°44'N, 109°09'E)	Special district	Lo-tung, Pai-sha, Pao-t'ing, Tung-fang, Ch'ung-chang Hsien.	
West Kwangsi Chuang Aut. Dist.	110,000	6,200,000	4,000,000 Chuang	Dec 1952	Tan Ying-chi	Nan-ning (22°49'N, 108°19'E)	Special district	33 hsien	
San-chiang T'ung Aut. Area	Unknown	202,000	46 percent T'ung (Thai)	3 Dec 1952	Unknown	San-chiang (25°47'N, 109°36'E)	Hsien	Unknown	
Lung-sheng Democratic Coalition Area	Unknown	Unknown	Miao and Yao	Jul 1951	Unknown	Lung-sheng (25°48'N, 110°00'E)	Hsien	Unknown	
Tung-shan Yao Aut. Area	Unknown	Unknown	Yao	27 Sep 1951	Unknown	Unknown	Sub-hsien	Unknown	
Lien-nan Yao Aut. Area	Unknown	89,000	24,000 Yao	Jan 1953	Liang Ch'iu	Lien-nan (24°42'N, 112°16'E)	Hsien	Lien-nan Hsien	
Ta-yao-shan Aut. Area	Unknown	98,000	18,000 Yao	20 Apr 1952	Unknown	Chin-hsiu (24°08'N, 110°12'E)	Hsien	Parts of Li-p'u, Meng-shan, P'ing-lo, Kuei-p'ing, Hsiang, Wu-suan Hsien.	
Shih-wan-shan Aut. Area	Unknown	Unknown	Yao	7 Oct 1952	Lei Ta-ming	Wan-ch'eng (22°51'N, 107°25'E)	Sub-hsien	Unknown	
Ta-miao Aut. Area	Unknown	160,000	80,000 Miao	Nov 1952	Yang Wei-kuei	Unknown	Hsien	Unknown	
Lung-lin Multi- national Aut. Area	Unknown	184,000	Thai and Miao	1 Jan 1953	Unknown	Lung-lin (23°09'N, 106°14'E)	Hsien	Unknown	

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APPENDIX C

GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE

Serious gaps in information exist concerning the autonomous governments and minority program of Communist China. Considering the large number of minority peoples in China, very few detailed and comprehensive studies of most minority groups have been made. Although data are available regarding the major autonomous units, there is little information on autonomous units at lower levels of administration. Undoubtedly a great many more of these smaller autonomous units have been created than are located and described on the accompanying map and table. Specific information as to exact area, population, and ethnic composition is lacking for many autonomous units. Very little information is available concerning the current political situation in Sinkiang, Tibet, and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. The theoretical methods and plans of the Chinese Communists in carrying out their program in minority-inhabited areas are known, but the state of implementation of the Communist program is almost unknown. Only fragmentary information is available concerning the precise interrelationships between autonomous units and Chinese administrative units. A very serious gap is the lack of information on the attitudes and reactions of minority people toward the Communist program.

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2. Sources

Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated "Eval.," have the following significance:

<u>Source of Information</u>	<u>Information</u>
A - Completely reliable	1 - Confirmed by other sources
B - Usually reliable	2 - Probably true
C - Fairly reliable	3 - Possibly true
D - Not usually reliable	4 - Doubtful
E - Not reliable	5 - Probably false
F - Cannot be judged	6 - Cannot be judged

Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this report and apply only to the specific information incorporated into this report. No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the evaluation of the cited document.

1. American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 466, 5 Dec 1952, p. 10. U. Eval. RR 3.
2. American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 470, 11 Dec 1952, p. 22. U. Eval. RR 3.
3. George B. Cressey, China's Geographic Foundations, New York, 1934, p. 394. U. Eval. RR 3.
4. NIS 39, Sect. 42, p. 55. R.
5. NIS 39, Sect. 42, p. 53. R.
6. American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 470, 11 Dec 1952, p. 22. U. Eval. RR 3.
7. American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current Background, No. 118, 25 Sep 1951, p. 1. U. Eval. RR 3.
8. Robert B. Ekvall, Cultural Relations on the Kansu-Tibetan Border, The University of Chicago Publications in Anthropology, Occasional Papers No. 1, Chicago, 1939, p. 31. U. Eval. RR 2.

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APPENDIX D

SOURCES AND EVALUATION OF SOURCES

1. Evaluation of Sources

Since the Communists assumed control of China, intelligence of all kinds has been fragmentary. A limited amount of recent information has been obtained from returned missionaries, businessmen, and Chinese POW's. Other sources are Chinese newspapers, handbooks, radio broadcasts, and maps, but information from these sources must be treated with caution.


The best over-all source for generalized information concerning the minority peoples of China is contained in National Intelligence Survey 39. A recent study, Ethnic Groups of Northern Southeast Asia, provides concise summaries of tribal groups of Yunnan and Kwangsi Provinces. The variant tribal names listed in this source are particularly useful. Population figures for the minority groups are unreliable and, regardless of source, are estimates.

Nearly all of the information concerning the evolution and functions of autonomous governments is from Chinese Communist news releases. Fragmentary basic information, mostly in the form of Communist news releases, is provided for a limited number of autonomous units.

The few sources reporting the reactions and attitudes of minorities to the Communist program are incomplete, often contradictory, and cover different periods.

9. Paul H. Stevenson, "Notes on the Human Geography of the Chinese-Tibetan Borderland," Geographical Review, Vol. XXII, Oct 1932, p. 605. U. Eval. RR 2.
10. American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current Background, No. 195, 25 Jul 1952, p. 2. U. Eval. RR 3.
11. NIS 39, Sect. 42, p. 4. R.
12. Ibid., p. 57.
13. Ibid., p. 48.
14. Ibid., p. 49.
15. Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, Ethnic Groups of Northern Southeast Asia, 1950, p. 159. U. Eval. RR 2.
16. Chen Han-seng, Frontier Land Systems in Southernmost China, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1949, p. 67. U. Eval. RR 2.
17. NIS 39, Sect. 42, p. 49. R.
18. American Consulate General, Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 470, 11 Dec 1952, p. 22. U. Eval. RR 3.
19. NIS 39, Sect. 42, p. 54. R.
20. Ling Kuan-tien, Kuo-ch'ing Shu-lun (Inside the Lololand), Sep 1943, p. 106; translated as Report No. U-1411, 31 Jul 1951. S. Eval. RR 3.
21. Lin Yueh-wha, "Social Life of the Aboriginal groups in and Around Yunnan," Journal of the West China Border Research Society, Vol. XV, Series A, 1944, p. 54. U. Eval. RR 2.
22. American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 470, 11 Dec 1952, p. 22. U. Eval. RR 3.
23. NIS 39, Sect. 42, p. 49. R.
24. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Far East, 6 Aug 1952, p. AAA-12. R. Eval. RR 3.
25. Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, Ethnic Groups of Northern Southeast Asia, 1950, p. 146. U. Eval. RR 2.

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26. NIS 39, Sect. 42, p. 50. R.
27. Ibid., p. 51.
28. Ibid.
29. American Consulate, Tihwa, Despatch No. 13, 20 Sep 1948, "Travels in Southern and Eastern Sinkiang," (S), enclosure 3, p. 2. U. Eval. RR 3.
30. NIS 39, Sect. 42, p. 52. R.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., p. 53.
33. Ibid., p. 58.
34. Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, Ethnic Groups of Northern Southeast Asia, 1950, p. 139. U. Eval. RR 2.
35. FBIS, Far East, 19 Aug 1952, pp. AAA-9-23. R.
36. FBIS, Far East, 20 Aug 1952, pp. AAA-8-15. R.
37. FBIS, Far East, 19 Aug 1952, pp. AAA-23-27. R.
38. American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current Background, No. 150, 10 Jan 1952, p. 1. U. Eval. RR 2.
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40. Department of State Despatch 535, Hong Kong, 9 Sep 1952. C. Eval. RR F-3.
41. American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 412, 10 Sep 1952, p. 25. U. Eval. RR 2.
42. American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 393, p. 42. U. Eval. RR 2.
43. American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 412, 10 Sep 1952, p. 25. U. Eval. RR 2.
44. American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 403, 27 Aug 1952, p. 22. U. Eval. RR 3.

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45. FBIS, Far East, 27 Mar 1953, p. AAA-8. R. Eval. RR 3.
46. FBIS, Far East, 24 Nov 1952, p. AAA-9. Eval. RR 2.
47. American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 505, 3 Feb 1953, p. 24. U.
48. Ibid.
49. FBIS, Far East, 7 Apr 1953, p. AAA-14. R. Eval. RR 3.
50. FBIS, Far East, 21 Apr 1953, p. AAA-5. R. Eval. RR 3.
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54. China Project 1175, Radio Broadcasting in Minority Languages, 1950-1952, 9 Oct 1952. U. Eval. RR 2.
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58. FBIS, Far East, 8 Apr 1953, p. AAA-9. R. Eval. RR 2.
59. American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 343, p. 29. U. Eval. RR 2.
60. American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 482, 30-31 Dec 1952, p. 27. U. Eval. RR 2.
61. American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current Background, No. 157, 8 Feb 1952, p. 67. U. Eval. RR 2.
62. American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 499, 24-26 Jan 1953, p. 31. U. Eval. RR 3.


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63. FBIS, Far East, 11 Feb 1953, p. AAA-13. R. Eval. RR 3.
64. FBIS, Far East, 19 Aug 1952, p. AAA-16. R. Eval. RR 3.
65. FBIS, Far East, 13 Feb 1953, p. AAA-5. R. Eval. RR 2.
66. Ibid.
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70. New York Times, 29 Nov 1952, p. 3.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. Department of State Despatch 1905, Hong Kong, 26 Mar 1953, enclosure 1, p. 1. U. Eval. RR 2.
75. FBIS, Far East, 13 Feb 1953, p. AAA-14. R. Eval. RR 6.
76. Ibid.
77. American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 416, 16 Sep 1952, p. 20. U. Eval. RR 2.
78. American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 482, 30-31 Dec 1952, p. 27. U. Eval. RR 2.
79. FBIS, Far East, 19 Nov 1952, p. AAA-9. R. Eval. RR 3.
80. Chen Han-seng, Frontier Land Systems in Southernmost China, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1949, p. 5. U. Eval. RR 2.
81. Ibid., p. 6.


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87. Liu En-lan, "The Social Customs of the Tribes People as Affected by their Climatic and Geographic Environment," Journal of the West China Border Research Society, Vol. XV, Series A, 1944, p. 13. U. Eval. RR 2.
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89. FBIS, Far East, 13 Jan 1953, p. AAA-7. R. Eval. RR 3.
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97. Department of State Despatch 535, Hong Kong, 9 Sept 1952.
C. Eval. RR 2.
98. 
99. FBIS, Far East, 20 Aug 1952, p. AAA-11. R. Eval. RR 2.
100. Ibid.
101. FBIS, Far East, 19 Aug 1952, pp. AAA-14-15. R.
102. FBIS, Far East, 20 Aug 1952, p. AAA-11. R.
103. Department of State Despatch 2013, Hong Kong, 13 Apr 1953,
enclosure 1, p. 6. U.
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
S-E-C-R-E-T



ETHNO-LINGUISTIC GROUPS IN SINKIANG

Turki and Taranchi	Chinese	Tungkan
Kazak	Kirghiz	Mongol
KT Kazan Tatar	P Pamir people	So Solon
M Manchu	R Russian	Tg Taghlik
	Si Sibo	Tj Tadjik
		Uz Uzbek

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GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT

7037

AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENTS IN MINORITY-INHABITED AREAS OF COMMUNIST CHINA



CIA/RR-G-7

3 July 1953

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS

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~~Security Information~~

2 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION, ORR
ATTENTION : [REDACTED] 25X1A9a
FROM : RQM/OIS 451
SUBJECT : Survey of Autonomous Regions in China
REFERENCE : K-10086

1. On 18 February we discussed with you our need for a study of the autonomous governments in the minority areas of Communist China, and subsequently we received your suggested outline for the preparation of such a study. The outline, a copy of which is attached, quite adequately defines our requirement and we request that it be followed with particular emphasis on points III, A 1 and 2; IV A and C; and V A 1. 25X1A9a

2. Our case officer on this request is [REDACTED] ext. 8651, who will be glad to discuss any questions which may arise in connection with the study.

Attachment (1)
Outline

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CLASS. CHANGED TO: []

NEXT REVIEW DATE: 1989

AUTH: HR 70-2

DATE: 2/22/79

REVIEWER: []

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80090

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Staff, Project Control, ORR

DATE:

FROM : Chief, Liaison Division, OCD

SUBJECT: Release of ORR Publication

REF: (K-144)

1. Permission is requested to release CIA/RR-G-7
"Autonomous Governments in Minority Inhabited Areas of
Communist China" (Secret), [REDACTED]

25X1X7

2. If permission is granted for this release, it would
be appreciated if a sanitized copy of the report were
returned with your reply.

3. It has been certified by RQM/CIS that this release
will result in a net advantage to the United States.

4. Any conditions, restrictions or caveats your office
may wish to impose on the release, or partial release, of
this information will be strictly observed.

[REDACTED] 25X1A9a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T01018A000100070001-3

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80316

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Staff, Project Control, ORR

DATE: 10 February 1950

FROM : Chief, Geography Division, ORR

SUBJECT: Release of ORR Publication

1. The Geography Division would be extremely reluctant to approve the release of CIA/RR-G-7 "Autonomous Governments in the Minority Inhabited Areas of Communist China" (Secret) [REDACTED]

2. The basis for this reluctance is:

a. On the basis of need-to-know there is no justification for releasing this [REDACTED] Approximately 80% of the report is devoted to a discussion of the Mongols, Tibetans, and Chinese Moslems. These peoples inhabit Inner Mongolia, Tibet, Sinkiang, and other areas of Northern China which are greatly [REDACTED] removed from Vietnam, [REDACTED]

b. It would be extremely difficult to sanitize the report without cutting it to ribbons. Such statements as "The Communist policy of currying favor with minority groups may be important on Hainan because of its strategic location as a base for possible future operations against the Chinese mainland."

c. Since the publication of CIA/RR-G-7, additional information has been received which:

1) makes obsolete and incomplete the table and map accompanying the report and,

2) to some extent would alter some of the conclusions reached in the report and would somewhat change the emphasis of the conclusions.

3. As indicated in the memorandum of transmittal, it is anticipated that at some future date a supplement to G-7 (or a complete revision) will be issued in order to bring the situation up to date. With the advent of this anticipated publication the Geography Division will willingly accede to its release [REDACTED]

25X1A9a

25X1A9a

D/GG: [REDACTED] ae

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Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T01018A000100070001-3

1 - Ch/G 1 - GG/T
1 - D/GG 1 - chrono

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12 February 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Liaison Division, OCD

FROM : Acting Chief, Projects Control Staff, ORR

SUBJECT : Release of CIA/RR G-7, "Autonomous Govern-
ments in the Minority Inhabited Areas of Com-
munist China" (Secret) [REDACTED]

REFERENCE : Memorandum dated 28 January 1954 from
Chief, LD/CD to Chief, St/PC/RR (K-144)

1. Attached herewith is a copy of memorandum from Chief, Geography Division, ORR to Chief, Projects Control Staff, ORR regarding release of subject report [REDACTED]
2. In view of the statements of this memorandum, it is not possible to obtain approval for the release of CIA/RR G-7.
3. Attention is called to the last paragraph of the memorandum from Chief, Geography Division, ORR.

25X1A9a
[REDACTED]

Enclosure
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Distribution:
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TO : Chief, Geographic Research

Project No. 62-1281

FROM: Chief, Geography Division

Date: 11/3/54

1. Subject of Proposed Project: Organization of "Autonomous" Governments in Communist China and Related Developments since June 1953.
2. Statement of Problem: See 3. below
3. Requester: In letter of transmittal of G-7 to RQM/OIS, tentative commitment was made to revise text and map at some indefinite date. This will supplement CIA/RR-G-7, Autonomous Governments in Minority-Inhabited Areas of Communist China, dated June 1953, summarizing the significant Chinese-Minority Nationality developments of the past 18 months including (1) organization of new autonomous governments, (2) areas where implementation of regional autonomy has been slow or not yet begun, (3) official documents and pronouncements relating to this subject, and (4) problems encountered by the Chinese Communists in implementing their program, relating, where possible, to specific areas and groups.
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4. Responsible Analyst: [REDACTED]
5. Kind and Extent of Cooperation Desired from:
 - (a) Other division of the Geographic Area (include maps): D/GC Map initiated and is now in Drafting
 - (b) Other parts of CIA: None
 - (c) Outside CIA: Possibly OIR, State
 - (d) D/GI domestic procurement: None
6. Estimated Man Hours: 40
7. Completion Date: 1 December 1954
8. Probable Form of Final Publication: Intelligence Memorandum - G/I
9. Special Recommendations Regarding Distribution of Finished Report: Material to be slanted towards interest of the DD/P area and distribution probably should be accordingly.
10. Comments:

Chief, Geography Division

Approved:

Chief, Geographic Research

Date

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Assistant Director, OIR

Date